U.S.-Russian arms control statements are getting shorter and shorter. In the most recent one, a joint statement by Condoleezza Rice and Sergey Lavrov released today, is three short paragraphs long. The United States and Russia “reiterated their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions”, but said that the new lower levels should be “consistent with their national security requirements and alliance commitments”, which are more or less code words for “we’ll do as we darn please”.
Speaking seriously, now that a “straight-forward extension” of the treaty, as described in the Article XVII.2, is all but impossible, the question is what Russia and the United States can do to make a “post-START arrangement” meaningful yet practical.
I just wrote in a Bulletin Online column that the greatest value of the START Treaty today is not the limits on numbers of warheads established by the treaty, but rather the framework of transparency and interaction between the military that it maintains. This is not to say that the numbers are not important. They are. But I don’t see why we should pick another artificial number, whether it is 1500, 500, or 100 warheads. We should agree instead that the goal should be zero and concentrate on developing a practical mechanism that would make this possible. In this process, transparency, accountability and trust-building measures are more important and any specific numeric limit.
In practical terms, what the United States and Russia could do for their post-START lives is to agree that they won’t specify any limits on their strategic forces, but will continue data exchange, all kind of notifications, and some (but probably not all) inspections. This would require going through the text of the treaty and all kind of annexes to see what there is worth keeping. I’m sure there is a useful core there that would provide reasonable degree of transparency at reasonable cost.
The idea of keeping the transparency provisions of the START Treaty is the least controversial of all proposals surrounding START and has supporters in all quarters. To make it work we should recognize that transparency and accountability are valuable in their own right and should be kept regardless of whether Russia and the United States agree on any specific reduction levels. If they are determined to do as they please, we'd better make sure that we can keep an eye on them.
The book
Comments
Pavel:
Just to play the numbers game for a moment, without the introduction of the Reliable Replacement Warhead Project (RRW) that promises a reduction in the American inventory for the sake of new construction, I don’t see the US Nuclear Inventory dropping significantly below 5,000 weapons post-2012. I suspect the Russian numbers will stall around 8-8500 warheads. Any thoughts?
Frank Shuler
USA
Russia would probably have about 5000 warheads, counting those in reserve.
Attn: Arms Control
Zero nukes would be the WORST possible result of arms control. Why? Do you want to see another WWII? As much as everybody hates nukes it cannot be denied that they've prevented another world war. Nuclear weapons raise the stakes higher than any possible benefit from using them. And the US and Russia having zero nukes wouldn't prevent the countries you REALLY don't want having them anyway. It's really no different than gun control in that respect when you think about it. Asking law-abiding citizens to give up their guns won't get them out of the hands of criminals.
This is a common misunderstanding. Nuclear weapons may have played an important role in the past, but that doesn't mean that they have a role today. I think they are pretty useless today.
Pavel:
Scott Ferrin:
I disagree that Arms Control isn’t worthwhile or is an unachievable goal but I do agree, in the future, for such a policy to have any real meaning it must include others beside Russia and the United States. I guess the historical precedent is the Washington Naval Treaty of 1921-22 that for the first time in history attempted to regulate Great Nation Status by setting battleship size limits and numbers between the powers-of-the-day. Even that attempt failed for the United States on December 7th, 1941. I think Arms Control as we now think of it is over. I continue to think formal exchange of information (entreaties) between nuclear powers is both useful and progressive to building trust. I continue to hope such a post-START formal agreement is concluded between Russia and the United States.
Frank Shuler
USA
Pavel:
Elaborate please. How would the US and Russia giving up nuclear weapons force countries like Iran, North Korea, Israel, China, and so on to give up nuclear weapons? And how would not having nuclear weapons make it less likely that there would ever be a full scale war between say the US and Russia or Russia and China etc.?
Frank:
The Washington Treaty was broken by both Germany (the Bismark class) and Japan (Yamato broke both the 16" limit and the 45,000 ton extension). That's the problem with treaties; the nations that honor them aren't the ones you really have to worry about anyway. All you do is put limits on those who abide by the rules and those who don't continue to do what they want anyway.
> Zero nukes would be the WORST possible result of arms control. Why? Do you want to see another WWII?
- Agreed. Peace we have now is a result of mutual assured destruction.
Scott:
Actually, Germany wasn’t a signatory of the Washington Naval Treaty. What capital ships that survived scuttling at Scapa Flow at the conclusion of The Great War (First World War) were limited by the Treaty of Versailles. However, your point is made. Germany broke that treaty with the Deutschland class of “Pocket Battleships” with the Admiral Graf Spee being the most famous example.
Frank Shuler
USA
Gentlemen:
Do we really need Mutual Assured Destruction to ensure “peace”? If the United States tomorrow, unilaterally, limited its nuclear inventory to 1000 weapons would the “balance of power” be changed? I honesty don’t think so.
Frank Shuler
USA
Do we really need Mutual Assured Destruction to ensure “peace”?
- Surely. Balance of power is important.
Russian:
Here’s my point. If Russia retains an inventory of 5000 nuclear weapons post-2012 and the United States drops their numbers to 1000, do we still have MAD?
Both the Soviet Union (now of course Russia) and the United States have always deemed it necessary to maintain a nuclear inventory large enough to have the other launch a first strike, respond with enough weapons to “totally destroy” the attacker and then maintain a deployed reserve to force down any adventurous third party. The classic 1982 scenario was the Soviet Union and the United States destroying each other and leaving the Chinese the dominate world power. Think about this in terms of 2007. Is there any provocation between Russia and the United States that would be worth a war resulting in the loss of the largest 24 cities in Russia and America? I don’t think so. So, really MAD is irrelevant. Russia and the US only need to have a deterrent to keep the other honest. So each nation only needs a redundant, reliable deterrent. How many nuclear weapons are needed to ensure such a deterrent?
Frank Shuler
USA
I have to agree with Scott Ferrin and Russian, MAD works. Also, until it is possible to guarantee that the no nation will ever attempt to build a nuclear weapon again, it is folly to eliminate them. Pandoras box is open and as long as war and the lust for power exist, so will the motivations to have the ultimate weapon. So unless you can change human nature, eliminating nukes is a pipe dream and irresponsible. However, I believe that given the present levels of the arsenals of the other declared nuclear powers, the U.S. and Russia could reasonably have a MAD/ deterrent force of 500 warheads and 500 launchers each, and possibly even less with the use of very high yield warheads (25-50MT) (I would advocate Maneuverable re-entry vehicles and yields of at least 5 megatons to compensate for the absence of mirv's) Tactical nukes, alcm's, and free-fall nuclear weapons could also be eliminated. (ICBM's and possibly SLBM's only)
I agree: zero nukes is an idyllic and utopic situation. First US and Russia will have to reach a below than a thousand level (tactical and strategic). Afterwards, France, UK and China would have to be engaged in talks (5 parts) But, then, how to accord with India, Israel and Pakistan? I.e. Israel claim to “not have” nukes. And then how to deal with N. Korea, Iran.
Then those countries that had some capability but stopped its developments (South-Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Libia). In the end … unrealistic because too many actors. Always some interests will diverge and some part will be prone to exploit a given “window of opportunity”.
The reason the Washington Naval Treaty of 1921-22 did not work was the perceptions by the lesser powers, for example France or Japan, that Great Britain and the United States were setting artificial limits on ship construction and size to favor their navies at the expense of others. I think a key point here is the relationship of nuclear weapons to world power status. Are Great Britain and France “world powers” today because they have nuclear weapons? If so, does that mean Japan and Germany are not? Does that mean Pakistan is? If the United States reduced its inventory of nuclear weapons to 1000, would Russia follow? Would it matter? If Russia and the United States settled on 1000 warheads, what would happen if China or India matched this capacity? Iran? Would the “world power status” change? I really don’t think so.
The United States could easily maintain 500 sea-based weapons on its Trident submarines force; have 250 warheads for a land-based ICBM deterrent and 250 bomber weapons. Each single-warhead Trident submarines could hold 24 Russian or Chinese or Iranian cities at risk. Again, what provocation between China and the US is worth the loss of Los Angeles and Shanghai? Taiwan? Doubt it.
Thoughts?
Frank Shuler
USA
You are right Frank. But you are accepting that a 0 level is out of reach. In addition, this can work with 3 or 4 sides. How about an unspecified number of parties (today 9 but who know tomorrow) whit different sizes, different logics and changing strengths. That’s the today scenario. I can’t imagine the 2050 scenario.
Kolokol:
Is the United States prepared to accept, in the future, India will have just as many nuclear warheads as America? That Russia may have twice as many, three times? China more? Iran? Albania? That is the question to be answered. However, if the United States “realizes” that nuclear weapons by themselves to not a super power make, then perhaps progress can be made. If the US moved unilaterally to such a 1000 warhead limit, I suspect the world would adjust accordingly. As you have suggested, there are just too many countries that have nuclear weapons today or have the immediate technology to create such weapons to ever reach a consensus on numbers. Think of it this way, once an India for example reached this 1000 weapon plateau, what real advantage would be gained by building more? It really is all about trust. The United States is today trying desperately to build a future relationship with North Korea and while this process is agonizingly slow, progress is being made. The US could care less how many nuclear warheads North Korea has as long as they don’t export the technology or sell/barter the weapons themselves to others. But North Korea’s role in the A. Q. Khan network terrifies the US, with good reason. If North Korea barters a nuclear device to Al-Qaeda, no number of atomic warheads will protect American from attack. That is the future challenge, how to react to a military situation where MAD does not apply.
Frank Shuler
USA
> Here’s my point. If Russia retains an inventory of 5000 nuclear weapons post-2012 and the United States drops their numbers to 1000, do we still have MAD?
Dear Frank:
- It's a theoretical question, rather scholastic. Also, I don't think that Russia really needs (and wants) MORE warheads that US has; all the Russia needs is a balance of power, considering as a military power, ALSO:
- US / NATO / Russian aircraft-carriers;
- US / NATO / Russian navy;
- US / NATO / Russian aviation & helicopters;
- US / NATO / Russian cruise missiles;
- US / NATO / Russian ABM defence systems;
- US / NATO / Russian SSBNs;
- US / NATO / Russian SSGNs;
- US / NATO / Russian strategic bombers (including B-1B & b-2 & B-52 with it's FULL nuclear payload);
- US / NATO / Russian land forces, especially tanks and armored vehicles;
- US / NATO / Russian tactical (short-range) missiles and nukes.
- I really hope Russia WILL NEVER refuse from the reasonable quantities of nukes, both strike-ready and stored and arsenals, enough for MAD with US and NATO.
- I really think that 2000 - 2200 'strike-ready' warheads is a minimal 'warhead count' for not MAD, but rather for MID (Mutual Inadmissible Destruction); Topol-M & RS-24 constructor-in-chief, Yuri Solomonov, also told recently that 'Russia will have not less than 2000 [strike-ready] warheads in 2012'.
- If US NMD iniative will advance in a way, that it will affect the Russian MAD / MID capability, the warheads count for Russian strategic forces would excess the 2200 warheads limit.
- As to your assumption about 'US unilateral move to a 1000 warhead limit', I think - it's a wild fantasy. Today's picture is absolutely different: US have significantly MORE strike-ready warheads than Russia has. And don't forget about the 'balance' :-) in so-called 'conventional' forces, especially a giant fleet of US long-range cruise missiles, air-carriers etc.
> ...once an India for example reached this 1000 weapon plateau, what real advantage would be gained by building more?
- A real advantage: India will be a new 'center of power' in the world, and really center of power - contrary to the US & NATO.
- So, when India reached 'the 1000 weapon plateau', we will have a real multi-polar world, instead of 'single-polar' world, where only US and NATO 'rulez'.. :-)
- Please remember: 'Any power corrupts - but the absolute power corrupts absolutely'. Noone in this world, including US and NATO, MUST have NO absolute military power.
> and really center of power - contrary to the US & NATO.
- Sorry, my typo: really responsible center of power - contrary to the US & NATO.
Russian:
Obviously, I’m not a policy maker and my suggestion to reduce unilaterally the American nuclear arsenal to 1000 weapons is far from today’s reality. However, your response tends to make my point about these changing times. Russia’s national defense is totally defined by the United States. For America, especially since 9-11, such is not the case with Russia. The average American is far more concerned by the nuclear risk of Al-Qaeda or the rise of Chinese military prowess than any “threat” posed by Moscow. To be honest, I think the Pentagon is too.
Frank Shuler
USA
> The average American is far more concerned by the nuclear risk of Al-Qaeda or the rise of Chinese military prowess...
- Just a note about 'reality' of these concerns:
- As I remember, recently 'the average American' was VERY concerned about Saddam's 'weapons of mass destruction'...
- And where's these mythical Saddam's weapons, that's become a casus belly, to a REAL WAR???
- And, after this BRIGHTEST example, you're still prefer to tell that 'the average Anerican' do not mind-controlled by US mass-media, inspired by US elite?
Russian:
The average American was convinced Iraq had weapons of mass destruction because our government was so convinced. Not only were our intelligence agencies convinced but so were our allies. President Putin personally spoke with President George Bush to assure him Russia was convinced Saddam had both chemical weapons and the intent to use such weapons. Only the French demurred. Who knew the Quai d'Orsay employed the number two person in the Foreign Ministry to Tariq Aziz as a spy and had for years? Because our government believed, the average American supported our Congress when war was declared. Today, I think the average American would tell you the war against Saddam was won but we have little interest in brokering peace in a sectarian Iraqi civil war at the price of American blood. The United States, as always, stayed too long.
This concept of the “American Mass-Media” being somehow pro-government is an allusion you need to get a perspective on. The “forth estate” (the press) is always against the government; no matter what political party is currently in power or what political drama of the day dominates the headlines. Propaganda? The average American isn’t really influenced by such. In fact, the real elite in America have little to do with politics. Unless it involves the tax code. (smile)
Frank Shuler
USA
Sorry about the off-topic, but the thread about the RS-24 is now far behind. This article can give answers about the “new” ICBM. Off course Pavel feel free to delete if you consider this out of the thread.
JANE'S MISSILES AND ROCKETS - JULY 01, 2007
Russia tests a new ICBM
Doug Richardson
Russia launched a new model of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at the Plesetsk test centre on 29 May, writes Doug Richardson. The missile was fired from a modified version of an existing transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), and the target was at the Kura test range at Kamchatka in the Far East.
[...]
Kolokol: Thank you for the link. It's interesting to see that Jane's is getting its information from my posts (here and here). They could have included a reference to the source, though.
Anyway, they have no new information and their analysis is not quite correct. I'll try to post something on RS-24.
I removed most of the Jane's text from the comment because I try to avoid having long articles posted in comments.
Russian and others: I'm screening some comments in order to keep the discussion from diverting into subjects like the role of U.S. media etc. Please don't take it personally.
Well, common buses for both the Bulava and the RS-24 are likely. After all, Solomonov claimed two years ago that they were developing a “cross-service bus”. Although is not physically possible to just exchange the Bulava and the RS-24 (because of the difference of diameters) as booster of a given bus, the two buses would have a lot of common pieces. Furthermore, the 100 kg 100 kT warheads that arises from the rsm-52 seems to be the chosen ones (common warheads too).
Iraq was a `one-off' case and a bad example of the US drive for military intervention to search for WMD and IT won't happen again after this fiasco ... strategic balance of forces is a completely separate matter - the US, Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Pakistan, India and Israel will need to determine what geo-political strength they need to have through the possession of nuclear arms - Russia breaking the CFE is a non-starter, that will happen quietly!