The Bulletin Online
By Pavel Podvig | 24 April 2007
After a series of questions from its European allies, a number of strongly worded statements from Russian politicians, and a telephone conversation between Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush, the United States finally admitted it blundered by going ahead with plans to deploy elements of its missile defense system in Europe without asking anyone. Now, the United States is launching a coordinated effort to explain the deployment's rationale and even suggesting that Russia and the United States share missile defense technology and coordinate ballistic missile threat assessments.
Of course, none of this makes missile defense a good idea. But these steps could help tone down Russian rhetoric. While both the United States and Russia seem serious about not starting a new Cold War, the frequency with which they're issuing denials of hostile intentions is growing alarming. If everything was okay, nobody would need all the extra reassurances.
Nor will a U.S.-Russian dialogue about missile defense end the controversy. The United States insists it won't allow Russia to veto the deployment, and Russian leadership is openly skeptical about the justification for U.S. interceptors and radars in Europe. Still, a conversation is better than back-and-forth promises of missile deployments or Russia's threat to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.
The biggest problem with the current predicament is that it gives Russia yet another reason to believe that unless it makes credible threats, preferably ones that involve nuclear weapons and missiles, no one--not the United States or (old or new) Europe--will listen. This is regrettable since the security discussion in Russia is already heavily dominated by the Cold War concepts of "strategic balance" and a bean-counting mentality that places an emphasis on the number of weapons in Russia's arsenal. The outcome of the missile defense flap only reinforces these beliefs, doing all parties involved a disservice--most notably Russia.
Moreover, none of this needed to happen. Russia has tried to insert itself in the discussion about U.S. missile defense installations in Europe for the better part of a decade. Moscow even suggested engaging in a similar cooperative agreement to the one that's on the table today--consultations about ballistic missile threats and collaborations on technology development. Nothing materialized because the U.S. missile defense bureaucracy understandably perceived these proposals as a threat to its programs.
For all of the Bush administration's faults, it at least got one thing right: The Cold War is over; therefore, its concepts and strategies are outdated. But it erred in thinking that this means that all of the problems that Washington and Moscow inherited from the Cold War would simply disappear. This proved to be wrong--changing the Cold War mentality requires a dedicated effort on both sides. Instead, the United States and Russia rolled back most of the cooperative programs that existed in the 1990s. Bringing them back now would be a very difficult task.
So even though missile defense is hardly a worthy area for cooperation, we should welcome this development if it means Moscow and Washington start talking again.
The book
Comments
Pavel:
I agree on most points but the obvious. For ten years, Moscow has been talking with NATO about continental (European) missile defense both in the diplomatic forum and from the military side in general-to-general communications facilitated by the NATO-Partnership agreements. As Hamlet would say, “Ay, there's the rub”. None of this has anything to do with NATO. The United States is determined to push this through without regards to Russian sensibilities or NATO’s. The United States could care less what the European Union thinks on the matter. What the US does care about is the governmental opinions of Poland and the Czech Republic. Without their approval, this project is doomed. The pressure that NATO, the EU, and Russia together have put on the Polish and Czech governments has turned their opinion from supportive to cautious. The current US initiative hoping for some kind of “agreement” is playing to those audiences and not to Russia. There was no blunder.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank,
I totally agree with your take on the situation. I keep asking myself why the U.S. wants those interceptors there. The Iranian "threat" to those countries (or NATO for that matter) is practically non-existant. How can Russia or anyone else see this as anything but a provocative and threatening U.S. led NATO military expansion eastward? I think its reckless, arrogant, and stupid but it certainly fits with the current administrations global policy.
Jon:
NATO is really no longer a real traditional military alliance but has evolved over time into more of a security coalition. That’s why the expansion of NATO is really no threat to Russia or any country for that matter. For the Europeans, NATO is only the security component of the European Union but for Canada and the United States the realities are different. What role is the United States to play in this “new Europe”? It almost seems the Polish-Czech ABM system is politically designed to force the Alliance into making decisions it really doesn’t need to make. If political pressure on the Polish and Czech governments by NATO, the EU, and Russia forces the end to this project, how soon before the United States decides to take our military home? Remember, the real neo-con look at the world is not about foreign bases, alliances, and such. It is about “Fortress America” and building a new security for the United States in the 21st century dominated by American economic globalization. The historical conclusions of the Iraq War will only fuel this change. Also remember once these changes are American policy, they will be decades in completion.
No GBI in Poland, we’ll just take our B-61s and go home.
If you think the United States is struggling with its relationship with NATO and Europe, think how the poor Canadians feel?
Frank Shuler
USA
Gentlemen,
Since the economic resurrection of Russia started taking place the U.S. is clearly at unease. To dismiss the threat of interceptors is immaturity. There have been numerous successful tests done by U.S. with various systems and Russia's fears are genuine. I beleive Mr.Putin has correctly assessed the situation and Russia needs to counter the threat in all seriousness.
Pavel: I just read an article (http://www.washprofile.org/en/node/4229) which announces deployment of the Tender (SS-26) with two missile brigades: 92nd missile brigade of the Privolzhky-Uralsky military district and the 107th missile brigade of the Far Eastern military district. Quite unimpressive. I mean what could be better to help the US to realize their intended nonsense in Poland than to place them in the Kaliningrad district, transferring that future missile base into a pinpoint target. Any ideas why putins military advisers don't consider it?