The anti-satellite test apparently conducted by China on January 12, 2007 immediately reminded everyone of the U.S. and Soviet cold-war ASAT programs. Some Russian commentators even suggested that the system tested by China is just a replica of the Soviet “IS” system. Well, not quite.
The “IS” system (“IS” stands for “istrebitel sputnikov” – “satellite fighter”) was developed back in the 1960s. The system, which included an automated launch system in Baykonur, space-surveillance radars, and the command center in Noginsk near Moscow, was accepted for service in 1968. The launcher used in the system, 11K69, was based on the orbital version of the R-36 (SS-9) missile. The interceptor carried an explosive warhead that would detonate within about ten meters of its target (50 meters appears to be the upper limit for miss distance, although it certainly depended on the warhead).
The “IS” system underwent several modernizations – the first upgrade, “IS-M”, was deployed in 1978. It could target satellites deployed in orbits with altitudes of 250-2200 km (from about 250-1000 km of the “IS” system) and inclinations of 50 to 130 degrees. Designers of the system estimated that it provided the probability of kill of about 70-80 percent.
As far as I understand, unlike the reported Chinese system, neither “IS” nor “IS-M” was a direct-accent system – before approaching the target an interceptor would have to get information about its own orbit from ground space-surveillance radars. This would normally require two revolutions, so the intercept process would take three to five hours. The Soviet Union conducted a few one-revolution intercept tests in 1976-1977, but then returned to the two-revolution scheme. In any event, an interceptor of the “IS” system would have to reach an orbit, even if for an incomplete revolution, while the Chinese missile appeared to fly along a ballistic trajectory directly toward the target.
The last test of the “IS-M” system took place on 18 June 1982, during a large-scale exercise of the Soviet strategic forces. In 1983, the Soviet Union announced a unilateral moratorium on all anti-satellite tests. The system nevertheless underwent another modernization. The new system, “IS-MU”, was reportedly given a capability to intercept maneuvering satellites. According to the plans of the late 1980s, the system was to be converted to 11K77 Zenith launchers by mid-1990s. These plans, however, were interrupted by the breakup of the Soviet Union. In 1993 the “IS-MU” system was withdrawn from service.
The “IS” program was not the only Soviet anti-satellite project. In response to the U.S. program to develop an aircraft-based ASAT, the Soviet Union launched a similar effort. The decision to begin development of a “Kontakt” system, which would include an interceptor launched from a MiG-31 aircraft, was approved by the Soviet government on 27 November 1984 (the United States conducted first test of its system earlier that year – on 21 January 1984 and 13 November 1984). The “Kontakt” system was developed by NPO Soyuz. The system was expected to provide the capability to launch up to 24 interceptors in the space of 36 hours to hit satellites in orbits with altitudes of 120-600 km. The upper range of intercept was to be extended to 1500 km during later modernizations of the system. Development of the "Kontakt" system, however, did not reach the stage of flight tests and was suspended even before the breakup of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet ASAT project that the reported Chinese system resembles most closely is “Naryad-V”. This project, developed in the Salyut Design Bureau, involved development of an interceptor that was to be deployed on existing silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (both R-36M/SS-18 and UR-100NUTTH/SS-19 were discussed, but the UR-10NUTTH was the primary candidate). A missile was to carry one or two interceptors that could target satellites in a wide range of orbits – with inclinations from 0 to 130 degrees and altitudes from 150 to 40,000 km. Intercept of spacecraft on high orbits would have taken up to seven hours, but LEO intercepts were expected to take from 30 minutes to 2.5 hours. It may have involved a direct-accent hit.
The “Naryad-V” system was in active development up to the end of the Soviet Union and the project may still exist. The first flight test of the “Naryad-V” spacecraft took place on 20 November 1990, in a suborbital flight of the Rockot launcher (which is a modified UR-100NUTTH/SS-19 missile). Another suborbital flight of Rockot was conducted on 20 December 1991, but it is not clear if it was a flight test of “Naryad-V”. The first orbital flight of a “Naryad-V” spacecraft (again launched by Rockot) was reported to take place on 26 December 1994. The spacecraft was declared as “Radio-ROSTO” satellite. It is quite possible that it was indeed a peaceful satellite built around the “Naryad-V” platform – the information on the program is quite scarce.
[UPDATE: I forgot to mention another ASAT project considered by the Soviet Union in the 1980s - a non-nuclear anti-satellite interceptor for the A-135 Moscow ABM system. The project, approved in 1985, was known as "Amulet".]
Eventually, the common problem of all ASAT systems is that they are quite useless – the best they can do is to take out few satellites, which any space-based system should be able to beat with having redundancy built in. The cold-war U.S. and Soviet programs were driven mostly by their respective military industries, not by any reasonable military considerations. So far China has been sane enough stay away from the expensive and useless cold-war type projects. It would be sad indeed if it decided to change this policy.
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China has always been a military enigma. Powerful, yet weak. An introspective country only rarely standing on the world stage and not always feeling comfortable there when she does. I think the anti-satellite capability demonstrated by their destruction of an old Chinese weather satellite is only that, a demonstration. China wants to continually remind the world (read: United States, Japan, Russia, and India in that order) its technological improvements in warfare. Logically, how objective was such a test? How difficult was it to launch a ground interceptor and strike a “stationary” satellite you absolutely control? Actually, it really was a “fair compliment” to the Chinese military but, yet, hardly demonstrates a true military weapon. However, all this plays nicely into the hands of the “Military Right” in America that will see another enemy and want to build a counter-force to such a Chinese “weapon”. The real loser here may be Russia. The armaments game continues.
Frank Shuler
USA
I believe in all this, the real loosers are the poor people of the world whose voice is never heard in the din of the noisy propaganda war between the powerful nations. If the suspicion that breeds fear is not propagated by those responsible for administration of these nations for obvious vested interests of perpetuating their own rule, there would be no enmity between the common people of this world as well as no poverty.
I think it is quite clear that China's ultimate strategic objective is to bring the U.S. Global Positioning System under threat.
Pavel points out that US and Soviet ASAT programmes (as with US programmes today) were largely driven by their respective military industries so it is reasonable to assume that this is partly the case also with China. But it seems to me also that perhaps Beijing thinks that ASAT capability is a cheap asymmetric respone to (a) BMD (b) conventional US firepower embodied now in the doctrine of net-centric warfare; space is important for this and I think that during the invasion of Iraq the Pentagon relied mostly on commercial satellites for the space based component of "information dominance" that is so crucial to the whole concept of net-centric warfare
That’s right, Marko. If they are able to blind the American information system, they level the playing field. That’s the rationality behind the tests. Off course, a power demonstration is included in the message, but Chinese always said that they were pursuing asymmetric neutralization of technological advantages of potential adversaries.
All this just does not seem practical to me. Granted, an attack on America’s GPS satellite system might involve only striking certain orbiters that grid-project over the Pacific region and not the entire constellation. But, even such a limited attack on America’s defenses would invite a devastating counter-response. How could such an attack stay “regional”? The United States, or Russia for that mater, would consider an attack on its space assets as a precursor to a nuclear strike and would act accordingly. Where is the real advantage to China here?
Frank Shuler
USA
"" was posted before - Eventually, the common problem of all ASAT systems is that they are quite useless – the best they can do is to take out few satellites, which any space-based system should be able to beat with having redundancy built in. The cold-war U.S. and Soviet programs were driven mostly by their respective military industries, not by any reasonable military considerations. So far China has been sane enough stay away from the expensive and useless cold-war type projects. It would be sad indeed if it decided to change this policy.""
Well Pavel, this racionalization serves equally to USA - NMD Kill Vehicles since the target enemy could multiplie the number of ICBM missiles and decoys as much as USA multiplie its KV interceptors.
And Nonetheless USA is building this massive missile defence shield against China and Russia.
So if one error of China is equal to one error of USA Nuclear Missile Defences,
F-22 planes in Japan. Join military plans from USA and Japan about Taiwan independence, I can see that Chinas is actually right in doing its own wrong Sattelite defence.
Also i have to ask.
It is not possible for USA to easily modify its NMD interceptor Kinect kill vehicles to target Satellites from China instead of its ICBMs if it was required?
Alopes:
The mythical National Missile Defense (NMD) system of the United States is about 20 years away from completion. Even now if a hostile ICBM could be identified and tracked, it is anticipated three Alaska-based interceptors would be needed to attack a single inbound missile with a backup interceptor in California on call for a last effort. It is easy to see in this 20-year timeline, any attack by Russia with hundreds of warheads or even China with twenty, would overwhelm such a system. Four interceptors to knock down each missile does seem like a futile endeavor but, I guess the feeling is if only one American city is spared such an investment would be worthwhile. However, against an enemy with only a few nuclear missiles such a system has certain merits. (Read: North Korea or Iran or Somalia) Twenty years from now, many countries will have such capabilities; hence forgive my humorous reference to Somalia. Today, there is little “massive” about America’s missile defense shield. The Russian military understands this well. The Russian military also understands the real issue here. The entire American NMD system is really just a huge research & development project where billions and billions of dollars are being invested in a wide range of technologies. That research, in the future, will deliver a robust defense system, space based, that will change the balance of power in the world. That is the fear.
Frank Shuler
USA
I would disagree. Missile defense research will never be able to produce a "robust defense system". Offensive missiles and countermeasures wil always be cheaper than defense.
Pavel:
Agreed, assuming you would be able to move your "offensive missiles and countermeasures" to space so you can participate in the battlefield. Remember, a "robust defense system" does not guarantee a war without loss, however; it might “guarantee” certain wars would not start. (No guarantees, I know)
If this is not the fear, why is everyone so concerned by the American NMD system in the first place? Let the United States throw its treasury away.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank
posted that - ""The mythical National Missile Defense (NMD) system of the United States is about 20 years away from completion. Even now if a hostile ICBM could be identified and tracked, it is anticipated three Alaska-based interceptors would be needed to attack a single inbound missile with a backup interceptor in California on call for a last effort. It is easy to see in this 20-year timeline, any attack by Russia with hundreds of warheads or even China with twenty, would overwhelm such a system."
Frank you will be right if there wasn´t one thing in USA government doctrine that is called
- preventive wars and
- preventive attacks.
When one put together the F-22 planes, B-2 planes, cruise missiles from submarines, Aegis Cruise Ships with theater missile interceptors, nuclear bunker burster weapons plus
NMD Kinect kill vehicles to intercept the surviving missiles of a preempt decapitation attack, this
sounds very credible to me and very threatening to China point of view.
If China would be so wary of USA actions as USA government and some intelectuals use to be about China "moves and tests" it could, very well, point and accuse USA in the same way USA government and world media in general is accusing China.
But there remains the question.
If USA can easely adapt its Kinect kill vehicle to attack also satellites so China will not be doing anything that others aren´t doing in the present day.
Alopes:
I guess the premise would be the United States would attack China, our biggest trading partner, in an out-of-the-blue strike designed to decapitate its leadership and destroy its small arsenal of ICBMs on the ground before they could be fueled, armed, and launched in reprisal. Such a strike would be preempt in nature because the United States has sensed some kind of Chinese threat and would be determined to get in the first blow. The American NMD system would then be in position to pick off any stray missile not destroyed on the ground in our initial attack. Given China and the United States’ common interest, all this sounds pretty farfetched to me.
Today, China's nuclear arsenal that “threatens” the United States is composed of 20 silo-ICBMs that are routinely unfueled and have their nuclear warheads remotely stored. I would summit; that is by choice. Chinese political strategy today is clearly designed to make sure such a nuclear “misunderstanding” never happens.
To be honest, America’s diplomatic response to China’s anti-satellite test has been rather understated and only mentioned abstractly in the press.
China is not an enemy.
Frank Shuler
USA
Alopes:
[But there remains the question. If USA can easely adapt its Kinect kill vehicle to attack also satellites so China will not be doing anything that others aren´t doing in the present day.]
Completely agree. I have no doubt the United States today has the military capability to destroy a satellite in elliptical or geostationary orbits. I think the Chinese test was a technology demonstration, and a most successful one.
Frank Shuler
USA
Frank -
" China is not an enemy"
Frank i agree with most of your statemens but i have to ask.
What would be the USA reaction if Taiwan changes its consitution in a de fact declaration of independence and, after that, China attacks the Taiwan government and military forces.
What would be USA reaction in that Taiwan war if USA has the NMD fully workable and the decapitation assets in hand.
What would be USA reaction if it knows that China could destroy some of its satellites, and plus, having some secret more missiles in hand with warheads in some mountains or cities in case of some threats of decapitation (China afterall show that it can surge its capabilities when nedeed) if USA think to go to war against China.
In fact USA government reaction wasn´t so strong, but there is the Iran question and USA needs China vote in UNSC for now.
And, in the other hands, Japan, Austaria and Britain reacted in concert and strange way to my view indicating a coordenation with USA.
Also one could consider any statement of USA as strong since China don´t came in public to tell that USA NMD tests is a threat ot its defences and an
Arms race provocation against China.
China don´t came to public to protest the coming of
F-22 planes to Japan and calling it a worring move that could spark an arms race.
That question of soft reaction is relative when is not me that is been wrongly accused for something that others also do or had do already.
Frank -
It was me in the post above.
I forgot to put my nick.
Anyway i like to say that in general China and USA have good relations and that is good.
But the Taiwan issue will be very dangerous in next years and i understand China moves.
Alopes.
Alopes:
Very interesting hypothetical situation. I think America’s response to a civil war between the Mainland and Taiwan would depend on the Taiwanese people themselves. The United States categorically opposes unilateral Taiwanese independence. The United States also opposes forced military reunification of Taiwan by the Mainland and that opposition is reinforced by a formal defense treaty to that effect. In the event of an unprovoked Mainland attack, would the Taiwanese defend themselves? I guess that’s the question.
The last thing China wants is for the Untied Stated to pull its military force from Japan. The Chinese strategy is to keep the Americans in and the Japanese down. The single greatest Chinese fear is a military resurgent Japan; America’s bases in Japan serve Chinese interest well.
Why is everyone so afraid of the F-22? Just curious…
Frank Shuler
USA
Dear Pavel:
Nice summary of Soviet/Russian ASAT programs. My sense is that ASAT development was a pretty big priority throughout the Soviet era. In addition the programs you mentioned, there were several other ASAT or ASAT-type proposals that were considered for deployment. Some never went beyond the paper stage, others reached major testing milestones.
1. Chelomey's Raketoplan manned orbital spaceplane, approved in 1960, was designed for both satellite inspection and ASAT missions. The program was terminated in 1964.
2. Korolev, Mikoyan, and Kisun'ko proposed an ASAT program very similar to the recent Chinese system. It was to use a direct-launched R-7 ICBM with an upper stage doing a direct kinetic hit against an orbital target. They sent a proposal to the government in November 1960 but the government chose Chelomey's IS.
3. Mikoyan proposed an air-launched ASAT project using an Ye-155 (MiG-25) in mid-1961. Also never approved.
4. In 1964-65, Kisunk’ko explored a ground-launched (‘cannon’) missile defense system that was also intended for an ASAT mission.
5. One could consider the manned Spiral' spaceplane also part of an overall Soviet military strategy involving ASATs. One of the versions of Spiral’ (approved for development in 1965) was an ASAT version. Spiral', of course never reached fruition, and work on it ended by c. 1978.
6. One might also include the (never-flown) Soyuz-P vehicle and Almaz space station (flown as Salyut-3 and -5) as having ASAT capability although these were very modest defensive systems. Salyut-3 test-fired its Nuldel’man cannon before reentry in 1974.
7. And finally, there’s, of course, the Kaskad and Skif systems approved for development in 1976 which used convention (Kaskad) and laser (Skif) systems. A demonstrational mockup of Skif, Skif-DM, was launched in 1987 on the first Energia booster although it never reached orbit.
One wonders if the Chinese have also explored in the past few decades many different types of systems, many of which never reached fruition.
By the way, I agree with you that a “robust defense system” is pretty much an impossibility given the relatively easy ways to counter such systems.
Asif Siddiqi
Asif, Thank you very much for the great list of the ASAT programs. I think it actually underscores the point that there was a lot of enthusiasm about ASAT in the beginning, but disappeared when it became clear that ASAT is not really useful militarily.
The only programs that do not fit this pattern are Kaskad and Skif, but I would argue that they were more of an attempt to find a useful payload for Energia/Buran. The projects of the 1980s were clearly a response to the U.S. SDI programs and also had a questionable military value.
Yes a strong China is not in our best interest, it is a big threat because they are communist./