At 11:30 MSK (08:30 UTC) on December 22, 2004 the Strategic Rocket Forces successfully launched an SS-18 (R-36M2) missile from a silo launcher at the Dombarovsky missile base. The missile warhead reached its designated target at the Kamchatka test site.
The launched missile is the latest version of the SS-18 family of missiles, known as R-36M2 or RS-20V or Voyevoda. Missiles of this type have a number of design improvements over their predecessor, R-36MUTTH (SS-18, RS-20B) – its second-stage engine is fully submerged into the fuel tank, warheads are arranged on a two-layer platform, etc. – which helped increase its combat effectiveness. With throwweight of 8.8 MT, the missile can carry ten individually-targeted warheads and missile defense penetration aids.
R-36M2 missiles were deployed in 1988-1992. The missile that was launched today was reported to have stayed in service for 16 years, which means that this is one of the first deployed R-36M2 missiles. The launch is apparently part of the program to extend service life of this missile to 25 or even 30 years, which is necessary to keeping these missile in service until 2016-2020, as it is currently planned. The Strategic Rocket Forces has about 40-50 missiles of this type in active service.
Today’s launch is important in other respects as well. It is the first launch carried out from the Dombarovsky missile base. All previous test launches of missiles of the SS-18 family as well space launches of the Dnepr launcher (a converted SS-18 missile) were conducted from the Baykonur test site. Launches from Dombarovsky would allow Russia to conduct test launches of the combat SS-18 missiles from its own territory (a total of five to seven launches are planned in the next several year) and, what is potentially more important, proceed with the Dnepr space launcher program without having to enter into arrangements with Kazakhstan.
Comments
Very good! SS-18 were my favourite missiles! However it's very bad that Russia possesses only 50 such missiles. I suggest to deploy once again SS-18's withdrawn from Kazakhstan in 1990's. This increase our SS-18 inventory to 150 and 1500 warheads! Then American ABM system will be without chances to counter them!
In fact, it is likely that the 50 R-36M2 missiles in question were deployed in Kazakhstan initially, but then were brought back to Russia. In any case, Russia cannot deploy 150 SS-18s - most of these missiles are old R-36MUTTHs, which were deployed before 1983. They are already more than 20 years old and are being withdrawn from service.
I have one doubt. Let's count USSR's SS-18 inventory in 1991. There were 308 such missiles at that time. But how many of them belong to R-36M2 "Voivode" type? I think that in Kazakhstan were 104 SS-18 (most of them R-36M2 in Zhangiz-Tobe and Derzhavinsk) and in Russia were 204 SS-18 (about 60 among them were R-36M2). All missiles from Kazakhstan were transferred to Russia. So, question is: Did all R-36M2 from Kazakhstan destroy in Surovathika according to START I treaty or they are keep in russian storage till now and could be redeployed again to replace older R-36UTTH model? If they are avaliable, it will be possible to:
1. Preserve 50-60 R-36M2 which are already deployed in Russia.
2. Replace 100 aging R-36UTTH by 50-100 R-36M2 from Kazakhstan.
These moves give total number of 100-150 R-36M2 and 1000-1500 warheads!
Besides, in my opinion, SS-18 is only strategic system which can, at least partially, counter US SSBN force armed with dangerous, very accurate Trident D5/W-88 missiles (many of this SSBN's already patrol seas not far from Russia!). US do not want to withdraw this missile from service but on the contrary already finishes rearming process of its SSBN's with D5. In contrast russian sea leg of triad is in shambles today. Therefore SS-18 must be preserve at all costs and at maximum possible numbers. R-36M2 model has a very modern design even now and huge anti-ABM potential thanks to its throw-weight: 8800 kg (= 10-14 x 1MT MIRV plus a lot of countermasures). I know, it is difficult because SS-18 were manufactered in Ukraine (now cooperation with Ukrainians seems unlikely after possible Yushchenko victory in tomorrow presidential elections and his turn to the West) but Russia must possess or even rebuild its own infrastructure to maintain SS-18 force for next 10-15 years.
As far as I understand, not all 104 SS-18s deployed in Kazakhstan were R-36M2, although some probably were. The best estimate of the total number of R-36M2 missiles produced is about 50 (one publication a few years ago mentioned 56, Kommersant this week said "over 40"). If you have data that say all the missiles in Derzhavinsk and Zhangiz-Tobe were R-36M2s, I'd be very interested.
As for production of R-36M2, it will be impossible regardless of who wins the presidential electons in Ukraine. The equipment that was used to manufacture these missiles has been dismantled already, so production of these missiles is out of question. In any event, it would make little sense - what Russia has now is more than enough in any imaginable circumstances.
Well your information about SS-18 are very sad. I read somewhere that deployment of R-39M2 was initiated in Kazakhstan, so I thought that all 104 missiles of that type were deployed there before collaps of the USSR. But probably this process was not finished. I will check it in my Internet sources soon. And for Ukraine: is it true that Ukraine and Russia jointly produces SS-18 variant as space launch vehicle? If so, it shouldn't be large difficulties between civilian and military variants of this missile. Namely, maybe SS-19 force is in better condition. They were produced in Khrunichev plant in Russia, so it won't be difficulties with keep this missiles in service, I suppose.
I have read on www.missilethreat.com that Russia brought 150 UR-100NUTTH's from Ukraine one year ago. I heard earier that Russia possesses another 32 UR-100NUTTH's withdrawn form Ukraine in 1990's. This brings an overral number of this undeployed missiles in Russia to 182 - more than currently is deployed in SRF!
So I want to ask "at source": Will Russia deploy all 182 UR-100NUTTH's now and replace them actually deployed missiles of that type? It would be a very positive move because it allows to keep 182x6=1092 strategic warheads for next 20-25 years in anti-ABM role!
Besides, how accurate (in CEP meters) is UR-100NUTTH ? Is it equipped with dummy warheads and has hard target kill capability against American ABM infrastructure (radars, C3I, antimissile silos)?
Could it destroy objects protected by NMD or tactical ABM systems such as AEGIS cruisers with SM-3 missiles, THAAD or PAC-3 mobile launchers?
I ask because UR-100N is quite old design (it was created in 1970's and was not improve after 1983).
I think it is reasonable to assume that the R-36M2 deployment in Kazakhstan stopped at the level of about 50 missiles. As for space-launcher version of SS-18 - Dnepr - these are not newly manufactured missiles. Rather, they are converted SS-18s that are being withdrawn from service.
As for UR-100NUTTH/SS-19s, there were 130 deployed missiles of this type in Ukraine in 1990 (in Khmelnistkiy and Pervomaysk). As I understand, there were eliminated in Ukraine (with U.S. financial assistance). Even if some of these missiles were transferred to Russia, it doesn't matter - they are more than 25-30 years old, so they cannot be kept in service any longer.
The 32 UR-100NUTTH/SS-19 missiles mentioned in the previous post are quite different. These are "dry" missiles - they have never been fueled and therefore, if deployed, could stay in service for about 25 years. It's a possibility, but there is nothing in the current Russian plans that indicated that Russia will do that. The bottom line is that the number of SS-19s that could be deployed is closer to 30, not to 180.
There are no data on accuracy of any of the missiles, but it would be a reasonable assumption that the missile is accurate enough to destroy hardened targets. It has a nuclear warhead after all, so neither AEGIS nor PAC-3 has a chance.
I have found some informations about amount of production of SS-18 in your own article!
It has a title: "Nuclear Parity and National Security In New Conditions " by Anatoly Diakov, Timur Kadyshev and Pavel Podvig. This paper was published in "Russian Nuclear Policy: Problems and Prospects" (Ed. by Ivan Safranchouk), The PIR Study Papers, N 14, May, 2000, pp. 40-47.
I this paper you announced, that: "Deployment of these missiles started in 1988 in Kazakhstan, the last missiles produced were delivered to Russia from Ukraine in 1992 after the demise of the Soviet Union. According to some sources, at present, 56-58 such missiles are deployed.Their total number is even higher, since 104 missiles withdrawn from Kazakhstan belonged to the SS-18 type. They can be deployed in Russia to replace the previous modification of this missile." And later: "According to our estimates, if Russia makes the decision to maintain its MIRVed ICBMs it may deploy up to 90 SS-18 missiles (with 10 warheads allotted to each system) and about 30 SS-19 missiles (with 6 warheads each), whose service life will not expire until 2010."
So if you estimated that Russia can deploy 90 SS-18 after 2010, they would have to belong to R-36M2 model because older variants can't serve so long! Therefore it must be now in Russia about 90 such missiles (and 900 warheads)! This estimate agrees with lower treshold of my proposition from previous message.
Now it is time to find this 90 R-36M2 missiles in Russia, because 90 is almost two times more than 50 missiles currently designed to leave in service! It won't be difficult to provide their maintenance because you additionally have astronomical numbers of spare parts from about 150 withdrawn missiles of older R-36UTTH type.
Once again in case of SS-19: I had read this news about these missiles in Jane's Information Group long time ago but I remembered about it just lately:
September 1, 2003 :: Jane’s Information Group :: News:
"In July, reports came forward that Russia had been purchasing 130 or 150 SS-19 ICBMs from Ukraine, the balance of the much larger number of those missiles which had been retained in that province after the fall of the Soviet Union.
The September 1 edition of Jane’s Missiles and Rockets reports that Russia is also purchasing 30 first- and second-stage booster stages for the SS-19 missiles, for a price equivalent to 50 million dollars. According to the report, these are the boosters for the RS-18 15A35, known by the Western designations SS-19 and ‘Stiletto’.
According to Janes, the Russian press reports that the programme for this transfer began in October 2002. These missiles, which had apparently been in “dry storage,” will now be transferred and stored in the Strategic Rocket Force facilities at Pibanshur in Udmurtia and Krizolotiovy, and will serve to extend the lives of the SS-19 stockpile. Janes says that the refitting will give the SS-19s an additional 15-20 years of service."
So I'd like to aks you: if it is true, Russia could prolong lifetime of all its actually deployed 130 SS-19 (130x6=780 warheads-not bad too!) for 15-20 years with utilization missiles from Ukraine?
First, on SS-18. In the 2000 article, as I remember, we counted both R-36MUTTH and R-36M2. We assumed that there are enough "dry" R-36MUTTH missiles that with 56 or so R-36M2s the total number of deployed SS-18s could be brought to 90, allowed by the START II Treaty (which was kind of optimistic, as I understand now). But we didn't have any data that would indicate that there are more than 56-58 R-36M2 missiles.
On SS-19s, I don't know where Jane's got their data on 130 missiles being transferred to Russia, not to mention 150. As I mentioned, 130 was the total number of SS-19 missiles deployed in Ukraine and they all have been liquidated by now (I'll need to check the START data). As for 30 "dry" missiles - yes, they exist, but I don't think they will be deployed. I would say it is much more likely that they will be used in the Rockot space launch program.
As far as I know the SS-18 deployed in Kazakhstan were with 120 warheads that were transfered to Russia from the SRF after the collapse of the USSR. The missailes as well as the silos were decomissioned. I do not quite think that Russia would be able to deploy more of these missailes and I am sure it does not need to do that at all. Most of all the SS-18 is a countrer force system designed to destroy the adversary's land based rocket forces. Therefore the SRF could install more MIRV (lests say 20 -25) on the SS-18 delivery system. In this way they could compensate for the amortization of the other systems, fultfill the limit of START II and retain parity with the US.
Pavel, would deployment of more MIRV per the same throw weight be SALT and START compliant?
In result of our discussion I feel that Russian authorities don't want to preserve Russia international status as a great nuclear power depsite they have such opportunities. Though Russia succeeded after USSR most its gigiantic military-industral complex which in terms of quantity of production was without equals in the world! So, if Russia retains all its SS-18, SS-19, SS-24 and SS-25 missiles in near future and don't compensate these moves by mass deployment SS-27 missiles (especially MIRV-ed), she will become second rank nuclear power with a few hundreds strategic warheads as France or UK and will likely be inferior to PRC, not mention US! In your present international situation this seems in perspective as dangeorius. Without powerful SRF, ad credible conventional forces, two other legs of Russian triad in their present conditions will not have any real significance. It results, in my opinion, practical Russian inability to react adequatly in crisis situations. A agree with Col. Romashkin that after 2010 Russia will lose chance of effective deterrence. Moreover I can't understand that Russia have no money at all for aquiring of new nuclear weapon systems. For example Votkinsk plant has capability to produce 50-80 SS-27 annually and government orders are ten times lower! This results put this factory in face of bankrupcy. I know that USSR produced several hundred ICBMs annually but fact that Russia now can produce several ICBMs a year is simply abnormal to me. In my opinion today annual production such weapons should carry out a several dozens ICBMs (which should be completely sufficient in present times) because it is hard to imagine that nowadays Russia assigns only 1% USSR's outlays for nuclear deterrence. Such situation is very suspitious and odd. Think about it and do something!
Post created by Mr. Pindikov is very interesting. But idea of rearming S-18 with 20-25 warcheads each - that is some kind of absurdity. Let's think soberly. Fifty silo based ICBM with 50x25=1250 warheads are most destabilizing targets in history of nuclear weapon. You wrote that SS-18 is counterforce weapon so it can't be deploy in large numbers. So, what about US Trident II missiles? In comparision with SS-18 they are much more accurate, have short flight time and are practically invulnerable. And most valid fact: US possesses ~300 of this missiles, each armed with 8 MARV warheads (especially "H-T-K" 475 kT W-88). In the event of war US could aimed at each SS-18 silo about 5 Trident warheads. So, in your opinion, how many SS-18 will survive such attack ? Base of any nuclear strategy is maintenance adequate equality between warheads and their delivery systems in order to suitable dispersion of warheads and preserve them to retaliatory strikes.
Right now, START I prohibits increasing the number of warheads on existing missiles. So, deploying more than ten on SS-18 is prohibited. Besides, it won't make much sense technically or militarily.
As for whether Russia wants to preserve its "great nuclear power" status, I'd rather not get into political discussion here. I would just note that the number of missiles cannot be easily converted to the great power status. The Soviet Union had quite a few missiles. Where it is today?
Where is USSR now ? That question must be put to "Mr. Gorbi", not me.
But better question is: Where will Russia be for ten or twenty years ?
Hello.
I've found one positive information in today's edition of "Guardian". It wrote that Russia and China probably will sign anti-American miliary pact in next year after joint big military exercises on the Yellow Sea and in Taiwan Strait. Such move, I hope, will contain NATO expansion and US provoked agressions on the all corners of the world! If US don't calm down, there will be PRC-Russia assault on Taiwan in near future! Hurrah!!!
"most its gigiantic military-industral complex which in terms of quantity of production was without equals in the world!"
1. The USSR was deploying one after another system to catch up with the US that were always ahead in the armament competition.
2. Deterrance is likely to work at the lowest levels (as with PRC that have no more than 10 countervalue delivery systems) or not work at all. Therefore 10 or 1000 for the SRF does not make any differance.
3. Russia needs SRF that would allow it to win conventional war and not lose nuclear war.
a) winning a conventional war - using tactical nuclear weapons against PRC or NATO to compensate for the complicated security environment while detering strategic escalation with overwelming ICBM potential
b) not losing nuclear war - using the SS-18 system as the backbone of the SRF (as you said 1250 warheads to destroy the LGM 30 system) and keeping the SS-25 as a strategic reserve after nuclear exchange to counter the other two legs of the US strategic thriad.
4. This is feasable and but as Pavel said prohibited by START. However if the US abandon the ABM threaty that was the only USSR success in nuclear diplomacy Russia would most probably cancel START and use its heavy missailes (R-360, UR - 500 and SS-18) to counter the US ABM.
However, in short to medial terms Russia would have one paramount aim to avoid confrontatiaon while preserving its natural sphere of influence. This could be achieved only by strategic build up, reasembling Breznev's conservatism and Gorbachev's foreighn policy ;)
Mr. Pindikov:
Your observations are all some kind of jokes! Let's make a "point by point" analysis:
1. Your consideration is only a proof who was a ringleader of Cold War arms race.
2. Deterrence on lowest levels? Let's check how it worked:
USSR: Why didn't US intervene when USSR invaded Hungary, CSRS or Afganisthan?
PRC: Why did Chinese escaped when US sent two carriers to defend Taiwan in 1996 or USSR threaten PRC with nuclear blackmail in 1969 and 1979?
Answer for both questions is: Because USSR had 10000 strategic nuclear warheads and PRC had 20 - and US knew about it very well!
3. You mentioned two things here:
a) at present Russia is without chances to win conventional war with NATO resorting to TNW use because NATO has:
- overhelming conventional superiority with PGMs equally effective to TNW
- US and NATO also possess more TNW than Russia what with geostrategical advantages they held (most NATO TNW based in Europe and Middle East can strike Russian strategic targets) gives them complete escalation dominance over Russia in all stages of such nuclear conflict
Therefore: first strike policy doesn't make sense in Russian situation!
b) Russia would also lose clean nuclear war with US. As I wrote before 50 SS-18 would be destroyed in 100% probability by US Trident II's in a first minutes of any conflict. And later you want to counter US triad by mobile SS-25s/SS-27s ? Now it makes sense because Russia has 350 such missiles. But in a few years it will remain only 30 mobile SS-27s. And such deterrence potential means nothing!
4. In my opinion Russia won't dare to cancel its agreements with US unilaterally. All recent 15 years evidence that Russia fears various US retortions. Remember Kosovo crisis and NATO enlargement.
And finally you want to avoid confrontation with US and preserve Russian spheres of influences. But there are conflicting tasks! Yes, Russia for 15 last years succesfuly avoided such confrontation. But what was the price? The price was high: In 1989 NATO border was 2500 km from Moscow. Now this border is 500 km from Russian capital! Let's wait some time more:...former Warsaw Pact states, Georgia, Ukraine, next Belarus, Kazakhstan,..., and later....Bush will say: "Let's examine your strategy of deterrence Mr. Pindikov!" :)
Mr. B.,
I was under the impression that this is a site for inteligent people and therefore insults on personal basis are not acceptable.
1. No doubt the Reigan administration was the initiator of the armament competition and if you check who was the vice president under Reagan you weould see that the same political though is in charge in the US at present.
2. As to your second point I do not know how is it different from my oppinion.
3. In the sence of overwelming superiority and disadvantaged geopolitical situation it makes sense for Russia to preempt so that it be attacked with 1000 ICBMs less. If you verify the Soviet strategy in the 70s and the beggining of the 80s you would note that it is the same. As to your rational counterpart Mr. Breznev his efforts to liquidate the intermediate range missailes were provoked by the soviet disadvantage from geopolitical character.
4. Thirty 1 MT warheads make sence provided that they are used in the second phase of the conflict.
Although the posibility for such a conflict is vurtually non existant SRF have to maintain signifficant capabilities. I agree that the only way to avoid Russian revanchism is to grant the russian people what is theirs. Russia is doomed to be a great power - this is a fact on the ground. I denounce the idea for Russian natural sphere of influence, but I recognize that there is and have to be Russian security zone - Ukrane, Belarus, Kazakstan and so on. On the other hand I still beleive that this is posible without policy of confrontation. A democratic and even nationalistic Ukrane is not a threat for Russia if it is in the EU since the EU does not have interest to initiate hostilities with Moscow. However the realities of the global economy clearly indicate that if Russia choses the path of beligerance it is doomed to lose a second cold war. The only rational choise is to folow the policy of Gorbachev regardless you like it or not. As far as the Russian interests are at stake I had always demonstrated my good will for their adequately adress them. Still since my country is part of NATO I am not quite suceptable to accept NATO clash with Russia. However people like me are minority in the west BECAUSE YOU LOST. That is also a fact on the ground, get used to it and consolidate the gains from your diplomatic efforts rather than playing them away...
Mr. Pindikov:
Ad 2. I clearly expressed that deterrence does not work at 10 warheads but worked at 1000 warheads! It differs from your opinion that deterrence always works.
Ad 3. I don't understand where you can see reductions of US strike potential? In contrary US is strengthing its superiority in that area with PGMs and convertion of strategic delivery systems to conventional PGM's platforms. For SRF it does not matter whether its missiles will be destroyed by Tridents or PGMs.
Ad 4. Maybe 30 warheads assure deterrence but you must have this 30 warheads first! When you have 30 ones before US attack - how many will remain after such attack???
Your further opinions are very naive to me. Ukraine in EU is not threat to Russia, but Ukraine in NATO with US bases and maybe ABM infrastructure will possess a very large threat to Russia. You wrote that Russia is doomed to lose a second cold war. But now Russia is loosing a "hot peace" with the West - so what kind of difference it is for Russia? It is necessary to stop NATO's "Drang nach Osten" now or it will be too late! If political or diplomatic means, as we can see, are ineffective, it will be necessarity to use military means, I suppose. Perhaps Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Cental Asian Republics and PRC alliance is a desired solution? Perhaps dislocation of Russian troops and TNW in those states will take effect? After all I'm sure that doing nothing is the worst Russian option!
I can certainly see Mr. Brezhnev's concerns given the state of Russia today. The deterrence the two sides had up through the 1980's served as a balance and "kept the peace." Yes the cold was was lost, but the chances of another hot war are slim and another cold war should not be considered.
The world is moving toward global economies, and the traditional global alliances have changed. There are alliances in areas where the primary threat is terrorism, and they could be used to encircle Russia in a hostile time.
The global economies have the potential to make war much more difficult. The European Union is one good example, with former enemies (Germany, France,etc.) using the same currencies, part of the same government, tying them much closer together, both economicaly and politicaly. This may be one of the greatest things to happen to Europe in hundreds of years.
Russia can also be a part of this and can have the same benefits and security as the rest of Europe. It will be possible to effect the change that will enable Russia to join a common Europe or a NATO (which may have outlived its usefullness) or a successor organization.
I would respectfully suggest that Mr. Brezhnev might want to consider even stronger ties to the west to achieve these goals rather than suggesting other alliances that run counter to joining in. This will be much better for Russia than a policy of confrontation. He can simply look in the reunified Germany or some of the other former Eastern Bloc States (Hungary, etc.) to judge just how successful a paradigm shift is.
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