UNIDIR Projects on Nuclear Disarmament Verification

As of 17 July 2024

Pavel Podvig, ed., Menzingen Verification Experiment: Verifying the Absence of Nuclear Weapons in the Field, UNIDIR, July 31, 2023.

This report describes the Menzingen Verification Experiment that modeled a mock on-site inspection designed to verify the absence of nuclear weapons at a military facility. The inspection took place in March 2023 at a former air-defense facility near Menzingen provided by the Swiss Armed Forces.

Verifying Disarmament in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, ed. Pavel Podvig (UNIDIR, 2022)

This report explores the concept of the verification of nuclear disarmament in the context of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The authors show that disarmament in this case will be a cooperative process accompanied by a deep transformation of the disarming state. While technical tools and procedures will continue to play an important role, their primary purpose will be to allow the disarming state to demonstrate its commitment to its disarmament obligations.

Pavel Podvig, "Practical Implementation of the Join-and-Disarm Option in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons," Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 4, no. 1 (June 3, 2021): 34-49

This article suggests a verification arrangement that does not require access to sensitive information during the weapons elimination process. This is achieved by containing nuclear weapons and all dismantlement activities in a dedicated segment of the nuclear complex of the disarming state. The only information the disarming state releases at the start of the process is the total amount of fissile materials placed in the segment. The dismantlement of weapons is verified by accounting for the fissile materials that are removed from the segment in unclassified forms.

Pavel Podvig and Ryan Snyder, "Watch Them Go: Simplifying the Elimination of Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons" (UNIDIR, August 2019)

This study describes a new approach to nuclear disarmament verification that would allow nuclear armed states to verifiably dispose of fissile materials that are no longer required for military purposes or to dismantle and eliminate nuclear weapons. The key advantage of the proposed arrangement is that it does not require access to sensitive information about fissile materials or weapons, which greatly simplifies the disarmament verification process.

Pavel Podvig, "Freeze and Verify: Ending Fissile Material Production on the Korean Peninsula" (UNIDIR, September 2020)

This study proposes an arrangement for a verified freeze of fissile material production through a new mechanism to verify the suspension of all production activities in the early stages of the denuclearization process. It would also provide a mechanism for building confidence and trust and create a path to expanding the verification programme. In the longer run, this freeze verification arrangement would ensure that all material, military as well as civilian, will be accounted for and placed under appropriate safeguards.

Pavel Podvig, Ryan Snyder, and Wilfred Wan, "Evidence of Absence: Verifying the Removal of Nuclear Weapons", UNIDIR, 2018.

This report explores an approach to disarmament that relies on the removal of nuclear weapons from their deployment sites and considers potential verification measures that can confirm such removal.

Pavel Podvig and Joseph Rodgers, Deferred Verification: Verifiable Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks (UNIDIR, 2017)

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty to include declarations of fissile material inventories of all categories of materials, including materials in nuclear weapons. This arrangement, referred to as "deferred verification", would allow declarations to be legally binding and verifiable. Combined with the introduction of FMCT, this arrangement could be the result of fissile material stocks and the gradual elimination of all weapons-related fissile materials.