Russia and Military Uses of Space

Pavel Podvig

Working paper, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences Project "Reconsidering the Rules of Space", June 2004

Russia is one of the few countries that carry out full range of activities in space. It supports a number of space programs that range from manned flights to civilian and military communication, navigation, and imaging satellite systems. The launchers and launch facilities that Russia has in its disposal can deliver a range of payloads to almost any orbit. These capabilities make Russia an important actor in all developments related to military uses of space and especially in those that are related to weaponization of space.

Another reason Russia has an important role in future development in space is that Russia remains a nuclear state with sizable offensive strategic nuclear forces. Although the relationships between Russia and the United States (as well as other nuclear states) no longer have the adversarial nature that characterized them during the cold war, expansion of U.S. military capabilities in space may affect Russia’s security calculations and force it to take measures that would protect its strategic status vis-à-vis the United States.

Russia also has a significant capability to carry out its own military space program. Despite the setbacks of the last decade, when all military programs have suffered due to lack of adequate funding, recent steps of the Russian leadership indicate the intent to expand the military space program development. While it is not clear whether Russia could succeed in maintaining its military presence in space at the level that would allow it to be a peer competitor with the United States, these programs will be an important benchmark that would certainly affect the U.S. policy with regard to its military systems.

And, last, but not the least, Russian space industry could be an important source of space-related technologies for the countries that currently do not have space capabilities of their own. Whether deliberate or not, the spread of these technologies, military as well as civilian, will be a very important factor that would shape the future of space.

This paper presents an overview of the past and current military-related Russian space programs from the point of view of their ability to contribute to developments of space-based weapons or space-based systems. The paper attempts to estimate Russia’s capability to sustain its effort in development of military space programs and to see how these might affect the debate on weaponization of space.

Military space programs

Virtually all currently active Russian military space programs were initiated in the Soviet Union. Even in those cases when the first launch was conducted after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the research and development had been largely completed by that time. During the 1990s, the primary challenge that Russia was facing was to preserve the military programs that it inherited and to prevent deterioration of the infrastructure that supported space operations. To a certain degree Russia has been successful in meeting this challenge, as it managed to keep most of its military space systems in operation. However, as wee will see below, in most cases the systems in question were operating at a level that did not provide full operational capability and had to rely on equipment that were manufactured before the Soviet Union’s breakup.

As part of its extensive space program the Soviet Union developed and deployed military space-based systems in virtually all categories – from missile early warning to reconnaissance and from communication to satellite navigation. The extent to which these systems are supported today can help determine priorities of the Russian armed forces, although one has to take into account that in reality the support depends on a number of factors – from real operational needs of the armed forces to an ability to manufacture spacecraft and launchers in Russia and interests of the space industry. This makes determining the priorities more difficult, but still allows us to make conclusions about the direction of development of the Russian military space program.

As of 2004, Russia maintained active military space programs in five areas – early warning,  optical reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and signal intelligence.

Early-warning satellites

Sensors deployed in space are traditionally considered a vital component of an early-warning system if it is to provide a timely warning about a missile attack. Since sensors in space can be made capable of detecting ballistic missiles almost immediately after their launch, they can provide the maximum possible warning time – up to 30 minutes in the case of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union began development of its space-based early-warning system in 1971 and was able to deploy it by 1982.[1] Early-warning satellites of the system complement a network of radars that are deployed along the periphery of the Soviet territory.

The space-based early-warning system, known as Oko or US-KS, in its full configuration consists of up to nine satellites on highly-elliptical orbits and one satellite on a geostationary orbit. This configuration allows the system to perform continuous coverage of ICBM bases on the U.S. territory. Submarine patrol areas in the ocean are not covered by this system, so it cannot detect launches of sea-based ballistic missiles.

To maintain continuous coverage of U.S. ICBM bases the system is required to have at least four satellites on highly-elliptical orbits (HEO). Filling all nine HEO slots in the constellation as well as adding a geostationary satellite to it increases reliability of detection, but does not extend the coverage in a substantial way.[2] Until mid-1990s Russia had managed to maintain the Oko system in almost full capacity and had the capability to reliably detect launches of U.S. land-based missiles. This required conducting about three launches every year to replenish the constellation, and Russia was able to do that despite serious financial difficulties of that period. The capabilities of the system began deteriorating in 1997-1998, after a series of malfunctions caused premature termination of operations of some deployed satellites. By the end of 1999, the system was operating at the minimum possible level of four satellites on highly-elliptical orbits.

Table 1. Recent launches of early-warning satellites

	NORAD number	Launch date	Inclination, degrees	Perigee, km	Apogee, km	End of operation	Comment
US-KS/Oko
Cosmos-2345	24894	1997/08/14	3.6	35118	36466	02/1999	24W
Cosmos-2351	25327	1998/05/07	64.6	3210	37200	05/2001
Cosmos-2368	26042	1999/12/27	63.1	2394	37977	12/2002
Cosmos-2379	26892	24.08.01	0.6	35770	35804	Active	24W
Cosmos-2388	27409	02.04.02	64.3	490	39842	Active
Cosmos-2393	27613	24.12.02	63.0	879	39454	Active
US-KMO
Cosmos-2350	25315	1998/04/29	2.1	35758	35808	06/1998
Cosmos-2397	27775	24.04.03	2.0	35545	35908	05/2003

 

The system suffered further setback on May 2001, when a fire destroyed the system’s command and control center at Serpukhov-15 near Moscow. As a result of the fire Russia lost control over all four satellites deployed at the time and for about four months did not have a capability to detect missile launches from space.[3] All four satellites have been eventually lost and were replaced by two satellites on highly-elliptical orbits, Cosmos-2388 and Cosmos-2393, and one geostationary satellite, Cosmos-2379. The system operates in this configuration, which theoretically allows maintaining continuous coverage of U.S. ICBM fields, albeit with reduced reliability, since the end of 2002 and the Russian military has not attempted to add more satellites to the constellation.

Since the capabilities of the Oko/US-KS do not allow it to detect launches from areas other than continental United States, in 1980s the Soviet Union began development of a new generation of early-warning satellites. The new satellites were to have capability to detect missiles against a background of Earth’s cloud cover and were to be deployed both on highly-elliptical and geostationary orbits. The new system was designated US-KMO.

The first early-warning satellite of the new generation was launched in 1991. By 2004, the number of US-KMO satellite launches reached six, the last one being Cosmos-2397, launched in April 2003.[4] None of these satellites is operational today, as the program has been plagued by satellite malfunctions, which significantly shortened satellites’ lifetimes. This is illustrated, for example, by the fact that all three satellites of the US-KMO system launched since 1994 ended their operations prematurely.[5]

Despite these setbacks, Russia seems determined to continue development of the US-KMO early-warning system. In 1998 it completed construction of a command and control station on the Far East, which is necessary to support operations of satellites that would be deployed over the Pacific.[6]

Optical reconnaissance

Russia is operating at least six different types of optical reconnaissance satellites, which vary in their capabilities and missions – from wide area cartography to detailed photography of specific areas of interest. As it is the case with other systems, photo-reconnaissance programs can be divided into legacy programs that continue from the Soviet time and the newer ones that became active after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The older programs, which still constitute the core of Russia’s imaging capability, are systems of the Yantar family. There are three types of satellites that are known as Yantar – Yantar-4KS2 Kobalt, Yantar-4KS1 Neman, and Yantar-1KFT Kometa. Although the spacecraft are quite different in their mission and capabilities, they share design features as they were built around a common platform.

Yantar-4KS2 Kobalt is a detailed-imaging photo-reconnaissance satellite that carries a photo camera and two capsules that allow it to return the exposed film to the earth during the mission. At the end of a flight the spacecraft itself is returned to the ground, working as a third reentry capsule. The flight time of a spacecraft of this type is typically about 60 days, so the film is returned with about 20 days intervals. Kobalt satellites have been deployed on a low Earth orbit with inclination of about 67 degrees and orbit’s perigee and apogee of about 170 km and 350 km respectively.

During the 1980s, when the Yantar-4KS2 Kobalt was the primary Soviet reconnaissance satellite, the Soviet Union was launching up to nine satellites of this type annually in order to provide timely collection of imaging data. As a rule, there was at least one spacecraft of this type on orbit at any given time. By the end of 1990s the launch rate has dropped to one satellite in one or two years, so Russia could no longer constantly keep an operational satellite on orbit, even though duration of the mission was almost doubled and reached about four months. The last launch of a Kobalt satellite, that of Cosmos-2387, was performed in February 2002. The satellite worked about four months and reentered in June 2002.

Table 2. Recent launches of optical reconnaissance satellites

	NORAD number	Launch date	Inclination, degrees	Perigee, km	Apogee, km	End of operation	Comment
Yantar-4KS2 Kobalt
Cosmos-2348	25095	15.12.97	67.1	176	370	14.04.98
Cosmos-2358	25373	24.06.98	67.1	167	334	22.10.98
Cosmos-2365	25889	18.08.99	67.1	166	342	15.12.99
Cosmos-2377	26775	29.05.01	67.1	176	382	10.10.01
Cosmos-2387	27382	25.02.02	67.1	176	369	27.06.02
Yantar-4KS1 Neman
Cosmos-2359	25376	25.06.98	64.9	240	302	12.07.99
Cosmos-2370	26354	03.05.00	64.8	240	300	04.05.01
Yantar-1KFT Kometa
Cosmos-2349	25167	17.02.98	70.4	228	286	02.04.98
Cosmos-2373	26552	29.09.00	70.4	265	285	13.11.00
Orlets-1 Don
Cosmos-2399	27856	12.08.03	64.9	205	326	24.11.03
Orlets-2 Yenisey
Cosmos-2372	26538	25.09.00	64.8	201	313	20.04.01
Arkon
Cosmos-2344	24827	06.06.97	63.4	1509	2748	10/1997
Cosmos-2392	27470	25.07.02	63.5	1507	1834	07/2003

 

On of the most serious drawbacks of film-based reconnaissance satellites is their inability to provide data in a timely manner and their limited life span, determined by the amount of film a satellite can carry on board. Photo-electronic reconnaissance satellites have clear advantage in these areas and it was natural that the Soviet Union began working on a reconnaissance system with satellites of this type. The satellites, which are known as Yantar-4KS1 Neman, use electronic transmission of imaging information (using geostationary relay satellites when necessary).

Regular launches of Neman satellites began in 1984. Usually, a mission would last from six to eight months, after which the satellite would reenter the atmosphere. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union was launching about one or two satellites of the Neman type each year, in order to have at least one operational spacecraft on orbit. The situation changed in the late 1990s. After 1995 there were only two launches of Neman satellites – one in 1998 and one in 2000.

The third system of the Yantar family is the Yantar-1KFT Kometa topographic imaging satellite. These film-based satellites provide wide-area imaging data for military as well as for civilian purposes. These satellites began operations in early 1980s and were launched at a rate of about one satellite annually (nominal duration of a mission is about 45 days). As with other reconnaissance satellites, the launch rate has been decreased in the 1990s – the last two satellites of this type were launched in 1998 and 2000.

In addition to the Yantar systems described above, Russia is developing at least three other photoreconnaissance satellite systems. Two of them use film-based satellites – Orlets-1 Don and Orlets-2 Yenisey, and one includes an electronic reconnaissance satellite – Arkon.

The main distinguishing feature of Orlets-1 and Orlets-2 is the increased number of film capsules that could be returned to the ground during satellite’s mission – Orlets-1 has eight capsules and Orlets-2 is reported to have 22. In addition, it is likely that the optical system of the satellites allows them to get images with higher resolution than that achieved by the satellites of previous generations. Since the satellites rely on film for recording images, their lifespan is relatively short – from 40 to 60 days.

Orlets-1 is an older program – satellites of this type have been in operation since 1989. During the 1989-1993 period these satellites were launched annually, but after that there were only two launches – in 1997 and 2003. The last satellite of the Orlets-1 type, Cosmos-2399, ended its operations in November 2003.

Although the Orlets-2 program began in the late 1980s, the first launch of a satellite of this type was conducted only in 1994. That first flight, that of Cosmos-2290, lasted for more than seven months and seemed to have experimental nature. The next launch was conducted only in 2000. As of mid-2004, it remains the last launch of a satellite of this type. It appears likely that the Orlets-2 is still largely an experimental program.

Another optical reconnaissance program under development is known as Arkon. Development of this system began in mid-1980s, but it was not before June 1996 that a satellite was ready for a launch. The new satellite, Cosmos-2344, was deployed on a relatively high orbit with perigee of about 1500 km and apogee of about 2700 km, which is unusual for imaging satellites that tend to be deployed on lower orbits in order to get better spatial resolution. The satellite transmitted imaging information to the ground control center electronically, using geostationary relay satellites when necessary.

It is likely that one of the reasons for the choice of the unusual orbit was to facilitate longer lifetime of a satellite, which at high altitudes would be unaffected by atmospheric drag. However, the actual lifetime of the satellites proved to be fairly short. The first satellite ceased operations only four months after launch because of a malfunction. The second (and so far the last) launch of Arkon was conducted in July 2002. That satellite worked over one year, after which it stopped operations, apparently far short of the intended end of its operational life.[7]

As we can see from the brief overview of the Russian optical reconnaissance programs, Russia does not have the capability to maintain continuous coverage of the Earth with its satellites. Moreover, even if all its satellites were operational, Russia would have rather limited capability of getting high-resolution imaging data in a timely manner. New systems that are supposed to provide that kind of capability still seem to be at experimental stages.

Naval reconnaissance and signal intelligence

The Soviet Union invested considerable resources into development of a system that would provide the capability to detect ships at sea and direct missiles to them. The first version of this system began operations in the early 1970s. It included satellites of two types – passive signal intelligence satellites, known as US-P or EORSAT, and active radar surveillance satellites US-A or RORSAT. During the time the system has been in operation, the satellites and their mission profiles underwent a number of modifications. Operations of the active system, US-A, were discontinued in 1988, primarily because of the concern about nuclear reactors that were used to provide power for satellite systems. The modified version of the US-P system that is currently in operation, is known as US-PU.

The US-PU/EORSAT system includes satellites that can track surface ships by detecting their radio communications, radar emissions etc. A full constellation of these satellites includes three or four spacecraft deployed on circular orbits with altitudes of about 400 km. A US-PU satellite usually stays in orbit for about two years, after which it reenters the atmosphere. Until 1997 Russia had been launching one or two satellites of this type every year in order to keep the system operational. After 1997, however, intervals between launches increased to almost two years and as a result there was no more than one working satellite on orbit at any given time.

Table 3. Recent launches of signal intelligence satellites

	NORAD number	Launch date	Inclination, degrees	Perigee, km	Apogee, km	End of operation	Comment
US-PU/EORSAT
Cosmos-2347	25088	09.12.97	65	410	410	19.11.99
Cosmos-2367	26040	26.12.99	65	404	418	19.07.02
Cosmos-2383	27053	21.12.01	65	410	410	20.03.04
Cosmos-2405	28350	28.05.04	65	412	427	Active
Tselina-2
Cosmos-2333	24297	04.09.96	71	848	852
Cosmos-2360	25406	28.07.98	71	848	852
Cosmos-2369	26069	03.02.00	71	848	854
Cosmos-2406	28352	10.06.04	71	850	890	Active

 

It was reported that the US-PU system is being discontinued and Comos-2383, which was launched in December 2001 and reentered in March 2004, was though to be the last satellite of this type. However, in May 2004 the Space Forces launched a new satellite of the US-PU type, indicating that Russia intends to keep the system in operation.

In addition to the US-P system, which was dedicated to observing electronic signatures of surface ships, the Soviet Union deployed a number of general-purpose signal intelligence and electronic reconnaissance systems of the Tselina family. The first two generations of signal intelligence satellites, Tselina-O and Tselina-D, were in operation until 1984 and 1994 respectively. The system that is currently in operation is known as Tselina-2. Its development began in mid-1970s and the first spacecraft was launched in 1984.

Tselina-2 satellites are deployed on relatively high circular orbits (altitude about 850 km). A full Tselina-2 constellation would consist of four satellites in four orbital planes. Until mid-1990s Russia has managed to maintain an almost full constellation, but by the beginning of 2004 there was only one operational satellite on orbit. In June 2004 the Space Forces launched a new satellite of the Tselina-2 type, bringing the number of operational satellite to two.

It is not clear to what extent the Russian military will continue to rely on the Tselina-2 system in the future. The spacecraft and the launcher that is used to place it into orbit, Zenit-2, are produced in Ukraine, which probably makes a long-term commitment to this system unlikely.

There have been reports that Russia is developing a new system, which will replace both Tselina-2 and the US-PU systems, but the details are scarce.

Navigation satellites

There are two major military navigation systems that are currently in use in Russia. The first one is known as Tsiklon or Parus, includes satellites on circular orbits with altitudes of about 1000 km. The accuracy provided by this system is about 100 m. This system was initially developed as a military system, but later was widely used for navigation by the Soviet (and now Russian) civilian ships. In the recent years Russia has been launching about one satellite a year, which was probably enough to keep the system operational.

Another navigation system, known as Glonass, is the Soviet/Russian equivalent of the U.S. Navstar/GPS system. Like its U.S. counterpart, it includes satellites deployed on semi-synchronous circular orbits with altitudes of 20000 km. There are also differences in configuration – the Russian system includes 24 satellite deployed in three orbital planes (as opposed to four orbital planes for GPS). The accuracy provided by the Glonass system (assuming that the full constellation is deployed) is comparable to that of GPS.

Table 4. Recent launches of navigation satellites

	NORAD number	Launch date	Inclination, degrees	Perigee, km	Apogee, km	End of operation	Comment
Parus
Cosmos-2334	24304	05.09.96	82.9	968	1009
Cosmos-2341	24772	17.04.97	82.9	977	1014
Cosmos-2346	24953	23.09.97	82.9	968	1009
Cosmos-2361	25590	24.12.98	82.9	969	1013
Cosmos-2366	25892	26.08.99	82.9	963	1013
Cosmos-2378	26818	08.06.01	82.9	963	1010
Cosmos-2389	27436	28.05.02	82.9	950	1017
Cosmos-2398	27818	04.06.03	82.9	950	1017
Glonass
Cosmos-2362	25593	30.12.98	64.8	19119	19128	08.05.03	Glonass 786
Cosmos-2363	25594	30.12.98	64.8	19119	19128	14.07.03	Glonass 784
Cosmos-2364	25595	30.12.98	64.8	19119	19128	31.12.02	Glonass 779
Cosmos-2374	26564	13.10.00	64.8	19119	19128	Active	Glonass 783
Cosmos-2375	26565	13.10.00	64.8	19119	19128	Active	Glonass 787
Cosmos-2376	26566	13.10.00	64.8	19119	19128	Active	Glonass 788
Cosmos-2380	26989	01.12.01	64.8	19119	19128	08.01.03	Glonass 790
Cosmos-2381	26988	01.12.01	64.8	19119	19128	Active	Glonass 789
Cosmos-2382	26987	01.12.01	64.8	19119	19128	Active	Glonass 711
Cosmos-2394	27617	25.12.02	64.8	19119	19128	Active	Glonass 791
Cosmos-2395	27618	25.12.02	64.8	19119	19128	Active	Glonass 792
Cosmos-2396	27619	25.12.02	64.8	19119	19128	Active	Glonass 793
Cosmos-2402	28113	10.12.03	64.8	19137	19137	Active	Glonass 794
Cosmos-2403	28114	10.12.03	64.8	19137	19137	Active	Glonass 795
Cosmos-2404	28112	10.12.03	64.8	19137	19137	Unknown	Glonass 701

 

Deployment of Glonass satellites began in 1982, but the system had not reached initial operational capability until 1989. After the breakup of the Soviet Union the system has been suffering from mismanagement and inadequate funding. The Russian government has tried several times to commercialize the system, but they were unsuccessful. As a result, the system is being kept in operation, but the number of working satellites is rarely higher than ten. Consequently, the ability of the system to provide accurate navigation information is very limited. Another problem that holds back development of the Glonass system is the lack of equipment that would allow Russian military and civilian users to take advantage of the data supplied by the system.[8]

Despite of the existing problems, Russia seems determined to continue operations of the Glonass system and is launching about tree satellites a year to replenish the constellation. It is currently working on a new modification of Glonass satellite, known as Glonass-M, which will have longer lifespan and therefore will require fewer launches. The first satellite of this type was launched in December 2004. Development of the new satellite is one of the main component of the current plan of the Glonass system development, which envisions bringing the number of operational satellites to 18-24 during the next decade.[9]

Communication satellites

There are three general categories of space-based communication systems that are maintained by Russia – low-earth orbit relay satellites, satellites on highly-elliptical orbits and geostationary satellites. Although most of these systems have been developed with military applications in mind, they or their modifications are also used for civilian purposes.

The Strela-3 communication system, which includes satellites on low-earth orbits, was developed for the military intelligence. The satellites work in store-dump mode, receiving information as they pass over the sender and sending it to the recipient when they go over him. A full constellation includes 12 satellites deployed in two orbital planes at altitudes of about 1400 km.

The system became operational in late 1980s, replacing an earlier similar system. In addition to the military Strela-3 system, in 1992 Russia began deployment of its civilian counterpart, known as Gonets-D and Gonets-D1. Satellites of this system are currently deployed in the same orbital planes that are used for with the military ones and are likely to be used for military applications as well.

Deployment of the system was interrupted in 1998-2001, when there were no launches of new satellites for more than three years. In December 2001 launches were resumed and by 2004 the Space Forces deployed seven new satellites, indicating that Russia intends to continue maintaining this system.

Two communication system that include satellites on highly-elliptical orbits, are Molniya-1 and Molniya-3. The orbits that are used for deployment of these satellites are named after the satellites and known as Molniya orbits. An orbit of this type has a perigee of 400-1000 km and an apogee of about 40000 km. A spacecraft that occupies this orbit spends most of the time during a revolution at the apogee (which in the case of Molniya is located over the Russian territory) allowing it to provide better coverage of the country than a geostationary satellite.

Molniya satellites are used as relay satellites for general-purpose military and civilian communication. To maintain the constellations Russia has been launching about one satellite of each type annually. There were some exceptions to this, but the pattern of launch activity suggests that Russia will continue maintaining these systems in the future.

Table 5. Recent launches of military communication satellites

	NORAD number	Launch date	Inclination, degrees	Perigee, km	Apogee, km	End of operation	Comment
Strela-3
Cosmos-2337	24725	14.02.97	82.6	1409	1409
Cosmos-2338	24726	14.02.97	82.6	1409	1409
Cosmos-2339	24727	14.02.97	82.6	1409	1409
Cosmos-2352	25363	16.06.98	82.6	1300	1870
Cosmos-2353	25364	16.06.98	82.6	1300	1870
Cosmos-2354	25365	16.06.98	82.6	1300	1870
Cosmos-2355	25366	16.06.98	82.6	1300	1870
Cosmos-2356	25367	16.06.98	82.6	1300	1870
Cosmos-2357	25368	16.06.98	82.6	1300	1870
Cosmos-2384	27055	28.12.01	82.5	1415	1447
Cosmos-2385	27056	28.12.01	82.5	1415	1447
Cosmos-2386	27057	28.12.01	82.5	1415	1447
Cosmos-2390	27464	08.07.02	82.5	1467	1507
Cosmos-2391	27465	08.07.02	82.5	1467	1507
Cosmos-2400	27868	19.08.03	82.5	1459	1502
Cosmos-2401	27869	19.08.03	82.5	1466	1501
Molniya-1
Molniya-1-90	24960	24.10.97	64.1	1117	39237
Molniya-1-91	25485	28.09.98	64.0	988	39372
Molniya-1-92	27707	19.04.03	63.3	586	39765
Molniya-1-93	28163	18.02.04	62.9	791	39563
Molniya-3
Molniya-3-49	25379	01.07.98	62.8	466	40770
Molniya-3-50	25847	08.07.99	62.5	472	40813
Molniya-3-51	26867	20.07.01	62.7	255	40811
Molniya-3-52	26970	25.10.01	62.9	646	40658
Raduga
Raduga 1-4	25642	28.02.99	3.6	35783	35787	Active	35E
Raduga 1-5	26477	28.08.00	1.2	35775	35792	Active	45E
Raduga 1-6	26936	06.10.01	0.4	35777	35795	Active	70E
Raduga 1-7	28194	27.03.04	1.2	35766	35804	Active	85E
Geizer
Cosmos-2371	26394	05.07.00	1.3	35770	35806	Active	80E

 

Another class of relay systems includes satellites of two different types deployed on geostationary orbits. Satellites of one of them, Raduga-1/Globus-1, are used for general-purpose communication and were reported to have secure channels used for communication between the military leadership. Satellites of the Raduga-1 type are deployed at four points on geostationary orbit over the Indian ocean. The system has been in operation since 1989 and has been maintained with regular launches.[10]

The second military communication system on geostationary orbit, Geizer, is used as a relay for low-earth orbit satellites, including imaging and communication satellites. The satellites also seem to have spare bandwidth capacity that can be used for civilian applications. Geizer satellites have been in operation since 1982. A full constellation would include three satellites, but since 2000 Russia has only one operational satellite of this type in orbit.

Supporting infrastructure

Launch sites

By the beginning of 1990s, the Soviet Union had two primary space launch centers – Baykonur (also known as Tyuratam) in Kazakhstan and Plesetsk near Arkhangelsk on the north of Russia.[11] The centers held the status of test sites of the Ministry of Defense and along with space launch facilities included a number of military installations, used for tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The centers were operated by the military space forces with participation of the Ministry of General Machine Building, which had the responsibility for the Soviet space program.

Baykonur has always been the main space launch site. In particular, all launches of manned spacecraft and all launches into geostationary orbits have been conducted from there. The unique role of the Baykonur site forced Russia to seek a leasing agreement with Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The agreement that has been reached asserts Kazakhstan sovereignty over the site and requires Russia to pay an annual fee for using it. A January 2004 agreement extended the lease until 2050 and made provisions for development of joint Russia-Kazakhstan projects.[12]

Terms of the lease apparently allow the Russian armed forces to continue using the site for military-related space and ballistic missile launches. At the same time, Russia has been looking for ways to move all its military activity to sites on the Russian territory, which was stated as a long-term goal.[13] In order to do so, Russia has initiated construction of a new launch complex at the Plesetsk launch site and is building a new launch site, Svobodnyy on the Far East. If this work is completed, Russia will be able to conduct all its military-related launches from is own territory. Baykonur will most likely be used as a primary launch site for manned flights and for scientific and commercial activity.

Baykonur

The Baykonur space launch site was established in 1955 and since then was the primary launch site for most of the Soviet space programs. It is located in Kzyl-Orda region of Kazakhstan, at the latitude of 46º North and longitude of 63º40’ East. The northern location of the site limits inclination of orbits satellites can be inserted into (no orbits with inclinations less than 46 degrees are possible) and imposes a penalty in payload weight compared with the launch sites located closer to the equator.

The launch site territory contains a number of launch complexes designed to support launches (and rocket and satellite preparation) of a specific launcher type. Each complex includes one or two launch pads (or silos).

Two launch complexes with one launch pad each – launch complexes No. 1 and No. 31 – support launches of the so-called R-7 family, which includes space launchers that are based on the R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile design. Among these are Vostok, Voskhod and Soyuz launchers used in the manned space program, Molniya launchers used for launching satellites into highly-elliptical orbits, and modification of these launchers used for various missions. The R-7-family launchers can deliver up to 8 metric tons (MT) payload into a low-earth orbit (depending on configuration).

Launch complexes 81 and 200 service the Proton heavy launcher (each complex has two launch pads). Proton can lift up about 20 MT payload into a low-earth orbit and about 5 MT into a geosynchronous orbit. It is the heaviest space launcher available in Russia and is used for all launches of geostationary satellites. Baykonur is the only launch site that has Proton launch facilities.

Figure 1. Space launch sites and the network of control and measurement complexes

Another dedicated space launch complex at Baykonur is the launch complex 45, which includes two launch pads for Zenit launchers (one of these launch pads was almost completely destroyed during a failed launch in 1990). Zenit is a relatively new launcher, which began flights in 1985. It can deliver about 13 MT into a low-earth orbit and as far as military applications are concerned, has been used primarily for launches of reconnaissance and signal intelligence satellites.[14] Since the launcher is produced in Ukraine, its use for military launches will probably decrease in the long run.

Launch complex 90 is used for launches of a Tsiklon light launcher, which is also produced in Ukraine. The launcher was built as a modification of a R-36 (SS-9) missile and has been used for a variety of military and civilian applications. It can deliver about 3.5 MT into a low-earth orbit and has been recently used for the launch of a new US-PU naval intelligence satellite.

Other launch complexes at Baykonur are ICBM missile silos, modified to accommodate space launches that are performed by converted missiles. These are launch complex 175 of Rokot launcher (converted UR-100NU/SS-19 missile) and launch complex 109 of Dnepr launcher (converted R-36M/SS-18 missile). Used as space launchers, these missiles can deliver into a low-earth orbit about 1.8 MT and 4.5 MT payloads respectively. Despite their military origin, these launchers have not been used in the military space program.

Launch complexes 110 and 250 have been built for the Buran-Energia project (although some facilities date back to the N-1 lunar program). These complexes were used for launches of the Energia heavy launcher in 1987 and 1988. The program was terminated and the launch facilities have been mothballed. It is highly unlikely that the Energia system will resume or that these facilities could be used without substantial modification and upgrade.

In addition to the existing launch facilities, Russia and Kazakhstan in January 2004 agreed to begin joint work on a project that would include construction of a new launch complex, which will be used for the Angara launcher. This launcher has been developed in Russia with the intent to move launches of military satellites from Baykonur to Plesetsk.

Plesetsk

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Plesetsk was the only launch site at the Russian territory. Established in late 1950s as a base of R-7 intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Plesetsk site later became a major space launch site that was servicing the Soviet space program as well as a test site used in development of ballistic missiles. The Plesetsk launch site is located in the northern Arkhangelsk region of Russia (63º North and 41º East). The northern position of the site further limits the range of inclinations of directly accessible orbits and imposes even larger penalty in terms of payload, compared with Baykonur or other launch sites. Despite this, Plesetsk is being developed as Russia’s main launch site, especially in regard to the military space program. The main reason for this is that the site already has extensive launch support infrastructure.

Plesetsk has two launch complexes for missiles of the R-7 family (Soyuz and Molniya) – complexes 43 with two launch pads and complex 16 with one. These have been used for launches of reconnaissance satellites, communication satellites, and early-warning satellites deployed on highly-elliptical orbits.

Each of the launch complexes 132 and 133 has one launch pad of Kosmos-3 rocket. This light launcher (about 1500 kg into a low-earth orbit) was built as a modification of the R-14 ballistic missile. It has been used to deliver communication, navigation and signal intelligence satellites into low-earth orbit. The launch complex 133 also includes a launch pad that was converted from Kosmos-3 to Rockot launcher.

Plesetsk site also support launches of Tsiklon rockets. These launches are conducted from two launch pads at the launch complex 32. The complex is used for launches of naval reconnaissance satellites.

In the 1980s the Soviet Union began a construction of a complex that would support launches of Zenit rockets. After a series of delays, however, the plans to launch Zenits were reconsidered and the complex was reoriented for Angara launchers. The initial plans called for the beginning of Angara launches in 2003-2004, but it now clear that the work is behind the schedule.[15]

Svobodnyy

Until 1991, the Svobodnyy launch site was one of the operational bases of UR-100/SS-11 intercontinental ballistic missiles. After the missiles were decommissioned during START reductions, the base was chosen as a location of a new space launch site. The site, which is located at the latitude of 52º North, can potentially provide better conditions for access to a wide range of orbits than the site in Plesetsk.

The current development plans for the space launch site in Svobodnyy envision construction of launch complexes for Rockot and Angara launchers.[16] So far, the only space launches conducted from the site were those of Start-1 launcher. This launcher is a converted Topol/SS-25 ballistic missile, which can deliver about 600 kg payload to a low-earth orbit. It is launched from a road-mobile platform and therefore does not require construction of a launch pad.

Satellite control and space surveillance networks

The scale of the Soviet space program, both civilian and military, required substantial investment into ground facilities and infrastructure that would support operations of satellites. In addition to space launch sites, the Soviet Union built a network of ground control and measurement facilities that are used to control satellites, as well as stations that received information supplied by space-based sensors, processed it, and delivered to military and civilian users. The Soviet Union also developed a network of satellite tracking facilities that allowed it to monitor space activities of other countries.

Control and measurement centers

Every space system includes a ground segment that allows operators to control satellites and use process the data supplied by them. The ground equipment that allows to do that is usually installed at one of eleven stationary control and measurement complexes (OKIKs), dispersed throughout the territory of the Soviet Union (see Table 6 and  Figure 1). Some of these complexes specialize in certain tasks – the center in Galenki on the Far East, for example, has an antenna that allows it to communicate with interplanetary spacecraft. But usually a complex’s mission is determined by requirements of a particular system. Different programs may share installations when possible, but usually each program has its own dedicated equipment.

In the breakup of the Soviet Union Russia lost significant part of the Soviet control and measurement complexes infrastructure. Ukraine had three complexes of this type, one of which, in Yevpatoriya, was dedicated to deep-space communication and served as a node of the regional network.  One of the complexes in Ukraine served as a regional center for navigation and communication satellites.[17] A similar complex, which provided support for communication and navigation satellites, was deployed at Priozersk in Kazakhstan, close to the Sary-Shagan test site. A complex of a different kind was deployed in Kitab, Uzbekistan. It was one of the newest additions to the control and measurement network and was equipped with laser measurement systems.[18]

In addition to the network of control and measurement centers, Russia maintains a network of smaller orbit measurement facilities, which includes more than a dozen of small centers that provide trajectory and orbit measurements. Some of these facilities are deployed along the trajectories followed by ballistic missiles during their tests, some are located in the vicinity of space launch sites. To supplement stationary systems Russia operates a number of smaller mobile trajectory-measurement systems that are deployed as necessary. The Soviet Union also had five ship-based measurement systems, but none of them is in use today.

Table 6. Control and measurement complexes

Location	Designation	Comment
Russia
Eniseisk	OKIK-4
Vulkannyy	OKIK-6
Barnaul	OKIK-7
Krasnoye Selo	OKIK-9
Kolpashevo	OKIK-12
Nizhniye Taltsy	OKIK-13
Shchelkovo	OKIK-14
Galenki	OKIK-15	Deep-space communication
Solnechnyy	OKIK-17
Vorkuta	OKIK-18
Lekhtusi	Training OKIK
Ukraine
Dunayevtsy		Navigation and communication
Yevpatoriya		Deep-space communication
Simferopol
Kazakhstan
Priozersk		Navigation and communication
Uzbekistan
Kitab		Included laser ranging systems

 

Most of these control and measurement complexes and facilities are managed by the Main Space Systems Center (GITsIU KS) located in Krasnoznamensk (also known as Golitsyno-2) near Moscow. The center is a main control unit of the space forces. It accumulates data about operations of almost all military space-based systems and directs their activities. Control over civilian satellites is usually transferred to their own separate control facilities shortly after their launch (which is managed by the space forces). However, some civilian systems use the hardware of the space forces’ control and measurement network.

There are subdivision within the main center that are responsible for specific programs. For example, control of the Glonass system is the responsibility of a separate center, also located in Krasnoznamensk.[19] Some military systems, however, are managed completely separately. Among these programs are the US-KS and US-KMO early-warning systems, which have their own control center in Kurilovo, Serpukhov region,[20] and the US-PU naval intelligence system, which has been traditionally subordinated to the Navy.[21]

Space surveillance and tracking system

As many other components of its space program, the space surveillance and tracking system that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, has been adversely affected by the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Soviet space tracking system relied primarily on early-warning radars, deployed along the periphery of the Soviet territory. By the time of the breakup, most of the newer Daryal/Pechora radars have been at the stage of construction and then were left outside Russian territory. As a result, Russia has to rely on older radars, some of which have been in operation since the early 1970s, for its space tracking (and early warning) needs.[22]

At the core of the radar network that provides Russia with capability to track objects in space, are the Dnestr-M/Dnepr/Hen House radars at Olenegorsk (Murmansk region, Russia), Mishelevka (Irkutsk region, Russia), Balkhash (Kazakhstan), Sevastopol (Ukraine), and Mukachevo (Ukraine), Daryal/Pechora radars at Olenegorsk, Pechora (Russia), and Gabala (Azerbaijan), and the Volga radar in Baranovichi (Belarus). As can bee seen from this list, many of these radars are outside Russia, so it has to negotiate the terms of using the radars with the host country.

In addition to the dedicated early-warning radars, Russia uses radars of the Moscow missile defense system to track objects in space. It was reported that the Don-2N/Pushkino radar of that system provides the most accurate tracking information.

To track objects at high altitudes, where radars cannot see, Russia operates optical surveillance facilities. The most advanced of them is the Okno system, located in Nurek, Tajikistan. Construction of this system began in the 1980s, but it reached operational status only in 1999. The Okno system allows to detect spacecraft at altitudes of up to 40,000 km.[23] Scientific telescopes of the Academy of Sciences can also be given assignments to track space objects if necessary.

Anti-satellite system

The Soviet Union was the only country that developed and operationally deployed an anti-satellites system (ASAT), designed to attack satellites on low-earth orbits . The United States also worked on its own ASAT systems during the cold war, but abandoned its projects at the early stages of development.

The development of the Soviet ASAT system began as early as the early 1960s and the first test flights of maneuverable spacecraft were performed in 1963-1964. The development was managed by the TsNII Kometa design bureau of the Ministry of Radio Industry. The space launcher used in the system was a modified R-36 (SS-9) missile, developed by OKB-586 design bureau (now Yuzhnoye Design Bureau). Design of the interceptor spacecraft was assigned to the Lavochkin Design Bureau. In addition to the space launcher and interceptor spacecraft, the system included a network of space surveillance radars and the command and control center.

The first tests of the system were conducted in 1968. During subsequent tests, the system demonstrated its capability to destroy satellites on low orbits with altitudes of up to 1000 km. The system was tested with different intercept geometries, onboard sensors, and proximity fuses (infrared and radar).

The system was accepted for service and commissioned for active duty in 1979. The launchers – modified R-36 (SS-9) missiles – were deployed at the Baykonur test site. Testing continued until 1982, after which in November 1983 the Soviet leadership announced a unilateral moratorium on further ASAT tests and the system was put on hold.

The status of the ASAT system deployed in Baykonur has never been officially disclosed, but it is certain that the system is no longer operational. There were reports that the system underwent modernization in 1991, but since it was done without flight tests it is highly unlikely that this modernization involved any significant upgrades. Significant parts of the space surveillance network that is an integral part of the system, have been lost during the break up of the Soviet Union. Although Russia has not formally announced that the system is decommissioned, the current structure of the Russian Space Forces does not include any units that could operate the system, which means it is no longer functional.

Organization of the industry and the military

Space Forces

The current structure of the military space program is a result of a series of reorganizations conducted in the last decade. In today’s Russia, all military space-related activities are managed by the Space Forces, which is a separate branch of the armed forces, subordinated directly to the General Staff. This status makes the Space Forces independent from main services of the armed forces (i.e. from Air Force, Navy, or Army). In its current form the Space Forces were created in June 2001 by a presidential decree, which transferred to the newly created branch of the armed forces all the units that were responsible for operating space-related facilities and satellite systems. In addition, the Space Forces include the units that are operating the early-warning system, space surveillance and tracking system, and the Moscow missile defense.

In the Soviet Union space operations and early-warning and missile defense systems belonged to different services and branches. Initially, all space-related activity was part of the Strategic Rocket Forces (and its predecessor), where it was managed by a separate directorate. In 1982 that directorate, the Main Space Systems Directorate (GUKOS), was removed from the Strategic Rocket Forces and was subordinated directly to the General Staff. In 1986 its name was changed to the United Space Systems Directorate (UNKS). In 1992, shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the units of the directorate were transformed into the Military Space Forces, which remained under direct control of the General Staff.

During a major reorganization of the Russian armed forces in 1997, the Military Space Forces were again subordinated to the Strategic Rocket Forces. This time they also included early-warning, space surveillance, and missile defense units, which were transferred there from the disbanded Air Defense Forces. All these units were transferred to the Space Forces during the 2001 reorganization, which created the Space Forces as a separate branch of armed forces.

The 1997 reorganization was a major change in the traditional structure of the Soviet/Russian armed forces. Historically, early warning of a missile attack, tracking space objects, and operating missile defense systems were among the missions of the Air Defense Forces, a separate service of the armed forces that was responsible for strategic defense of the country. In many important ways its structure and responsibilities were different from those of space directorate or Strategic Rocket Forces, so integration of these units into the Military Space Forces after the 1997 reorganization was a rather difficult process (although the situation appeared to improve after the 2001 reform).

As a result of all reorganizations, the Space Forces currently include the following main units:

·        Space launch sites – Baykonur, Plesetsk, and Svobodnyy

·        Space Systems Control Center and the network of control and measurement centers

·        Space and Missile Defense Army, which includes divisions that provide early warning, space surveillance, and missile defense

·        Other units, which include military academies and a directorate that is responsible for construction of space and missile defense facilities

The Space Forces are headed by Lt.-Gen. Vladimr Popovkin, who was appointed to this post in March 2004. His predecessor, Col.-Gen. Anatoly Perminov, was transferred to the Federal Space Agency, which is responsible for the civilian program.

Space Industry

The practice of research and development that existed in the Soviet Union gave ministries of the defense industry very prominent role in the development and production process. The armed forces were responsible for developing technical requirements for new systems and then for accepting them for service. Financing research, development, and subsequent production of a new system was the responsibility of the industry. Coordination of efforts of various ministries that were involved in large research and development projects, was the job of a special interagency government body, the Military-Industrial Commission.[24]

Development and production of space systems was the responsibility of the Ministry of General Machine-Building. The ministry was handling development and production of ballistic missiles, space launchers, satellites and the supporting equipment. It was managing most of the civilian space programs and provided oversight of the military programs.

Development of missile defense and early-warning systems was the responsibility of a different defense ministry – the Ministry of Radio Industry. Design bureaus and enterprises of this ministry worked directly on development of large radars used in early-warning, missile defense, and space surveillance and were primary integrators in other projects in these areas that involved other ministries of defense industry. For example, the Ministry of Radio Industry was responsible for programs like the space-based early-warning or anti-satellite system, but the launchers and spacecraft used in these programs were developed and produced by the Ministry of General Machine-Building.

In the years after the breakup of the Soviet Union the defense industry has undergone radical transformation, which seriously changed the structure of the industry and the way it handles development and production of new military systems.

In the early 1990s, as old Soviet defense ministries were being abolished, the key design bureaus and production plants of the space industry were transferred to the Russian Space Agency, which provided coordination of civilian space projects (including projects that involved international cooperation). At the same time, the role of the new agency was not as far-reaching as that of the ministry during the Soviet times and it was largely limited to handling civilian projects in space.

The situation with other military industry enterprises, including those of the Ministry of Radio Industry, was different. They were first transferred to the Ministry of Economics and then to its successors, as they have been undergoing a number of reorganizations. None of the successor governmental agencies, however, had the authority or the necessary organizational structure to manage or coordinate new development projects. Besides, in the 1990s the Russian government could not provide financial resources to sustain spending in the defense industry at the level that existed in the Soviet Union. As a result, much of the organizational and physical infrastructure of the defense industry has been lost.

In recent years the Russian government undertook several attempts to restructure the defense industry and streamline the development and acquisition process. The structure that resulted from the reorganizations repeats the one that existed in the Soviet Union in some important aspects, but in others, not less important, is different from it. The acquisition process in the armed forces is still managed by special departments inside individual services. However, they now have to deal with defense industry design bureaus and companies directly, rather than going through interagency process managed by defense industry ministries and the Military Industrial Commission. The Ministry of Defense is also supposed to manage development and production budget, which previously went directly to the industry.[25]

The main difference between the traditional Soviet system of research and development and the current Russian one is that the latter lacks an agency that coordinates efforts of various defense industry companies and determine long-term research and development plan. This applies to the defense industry in general and to its individual branches. For the purposes of this analysis, it is important to note that neither the military space industry nor the industry that was responsible for missile defense and anti-satellite weapons in the past retained organizational structure for managing development of new systems. Given that development work in these areas has traditionally required significant amount of coordination of efforts of various companies and ministries, that means that Russia probably does not have the capability to undertake large development programs in military space or related fields.

An attempt to correct this situation was undertaken during the major reorganization of the Russian government carried out in March 2004. As part of the reorganization, the Russian Space Agency was transformed into a Federal Space Agency and was subordinated directly to the prime minister. As it was already mentioned, the new director of the agency, Col.-Gen. Anatoly Perminov, was the commander-in-chief of the Space Forces before being appointed to lead the civilian space program. This appointment indicated an intent to strengthen both the civilian and the military space program.

Despite these efforts, Russia is yet to demonstrate that it can successfully manage a large-scale research and development project, whether military or civilian, in space. In fact, as we have seen, even without new programs Russia has enough problems maintaining the programs and infrastructure that it inherited from the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

As we can see from the overview of the Russian space program, despite recent downturns, the scale of the program, the existing industrial infrastructure, and the breadth of expertise that is still retained by the Russian companies, will make Russia an important actor in any development related to militarization or weaponization of space. At the same time, the exact role that Russia could play in this process, is still to be determined.

One possibility would be for Russia to fill the role of a peer competitor of the United States in space (and in military area in general) that was played by the Soviet Union in the past. This view of the future of the Russian space program is fairly popular among Russian political and military leaders, which could be explained by the fact that space remains one of the few areas in which Russian technologies remain competitive internationally. They see space as an area in which Russia can, and therefore should, maintain parity with the United States.

The attention that the Russia leadership has been paying to the space program in recent years seems to indicate that Russia is setting the goal of developing and supporting the full range of military space systems. If these plans materialize, Russian military satellites could be considered potential targets for space-based weapon systems (or ground-based anti-satellite system). In addition, the missile defense and anti-satellite programs that the Soviet Union had in the past seem to suggest that Russia could initiate new development effort in these areas as well, which would make it to deploy its own space-based weapons to counter the military space systems deployed by the United States. Although it is highly unlikely that the relationships between Russia and the United States would reach a point of competition or even arms race in space, the possibility of a development of this kind has been widely used to justify space weaponization programs. It is therefore important to consider whether realities of the current Russian space program would support the role of Russia as a U.S. competitor.

First, we should consider Russia’s ability to deploy a range of space-based military systems that would support operation of the Russian armed forces – optical reconnaissance, navigation and signal intelligence systems. Russia does have a number of systems of this kind in operation, but, as we have seen, none of them operates at full capacity. Besides, most of these systems have been developed in the 1980s and have not been modernized for quite substantial period of time, which makes them hardy suitable for support of modern military operations.

In many cases Russia also has to deal with the low reliability of satellites developed in the Soviet Union. It was not a serious problem in the past, when the military had access to virtually unlimited launch capacity. It is a problem for Russia now, since it requires large number of launches just to maintain constellations in a very limited configuration.

There is another potentially even more serious problem with the current Russian military space programs. Utilizing full potential of space requires significant investment into creating an infrastructure that would allow the troops to use information and capabilities provided by the space segment of a system. While Russia has been improving its capability to launch satellites and maintain and operate satellite constellations, development of infrastructure on the ground remains the weakest link, undermining much of the efforts directed toward broader use of space systems.

The Glonass satellite navigation system provides a very good illustration to all these points. It was developed in the 1970s and became operational in mid-1980s. In recent years Russia has invested considerable efforts into deploying a full constellation of 24 Glonass satellites in orbit. In order to achieve that, it had to upgrade the spacecraft to extend their lifetimes, because otherwise it could not provide enough launches to replace the satellites on orbit.[26] But even if the plan to populate all slots in the constellation succeeds, the ground infrastructure does not seem to be ready to take advantage of it. For example, it was reported that aircraft of the military transport aviation do not have Glonass receivers onboard and rely on the U.S. GPS system instead.[27]

Most of the same problems are also common to photo-reconnaissance and signal intelligence systems. While Russia has the capability to collect imaging information and monitor communications, these capabilities are not integrated into the command structure of the armed forces to the extent that would make these systems directly usable in military operations. The launch schedule of satellites that provide these capabilities seems to confirm that – for example, there have been no serious effort to maintain constant presence of imaging satellites in orbit. The same is true about signal intelligence satellites, where Russia does not maintain fully operational constellations. While partly this may be explained by the lack of sufficient funding, the example of other systems, namely communication satellites, shows that funding was probably not the only, or even the main, factor. As can be seen from the recent history of communication satellite launches, Russia has been investing considerable effort into supporting operations of its space-based communication network. Partly this was due to the dual-use nature of the satellites, which are used for civilian communications as well. However, military systems, like the Strela system, have also been maintained in close to full capacity.

The situation with early-warning satellites is also very characteristic for the current Russian space program. While the space-based early-warning system is considered an important element of the strategic command and control system, Russia, in effect, discontinued its efforts to maintain a full constellation of satellites on orbit after 2001. It seems satisfied with the rather limited capability provided by the few satellites it can support. Expansion of the system does not seem to the have the urgency that would have justified efforts to deploy the constellation in its full capacity.

All these factors make Russia’s space systems a very unlikely target for any space-based or anti-satellite weapons. Although theoretically attacking some of the Russian military (or civilian) space assets can adversely affect its capability to conduct military operations, in practice, none of the currently deployed military systems in space is advanced enough for an attack of this kind to make real difference from a military point of view.

This situation, of course, could change if Russia undertakes an effort to modernize its military systems in space and to integrate them better into operations of the armed forces. For example, if Russia completes deployment of its Glonass navigation system, it could employ it to expand use of high-precision munitions. Another development of this kind would be deployment of a naval intelligence system of the US-P/US-A (EORSAT/RORSAT) type that would allow detection of aircraft carriers and other ships. This example is usually cited (although in the U.S.-China context) as potentially justifying development of anti-satellite capability that would prevent deployment and operations of a system of this kind.[28]

While a large-scale development effort of the kind described above cannot be ruled out completely, experience of the last years has demonstrated that it would be highly unlikely. For example, as we have seen, Russia is experiencing substantial difficulties with the Glonass system. Similarly, deployment of a new naval intelligence system (or of other military system) would require a development effort of the kind that Russia has not yet been able to successfully manage.

Another possibility, that of Russia developing it own capability to deploy weapons in space or to build an anti-satellite system, seems to be even more remote. First of all, Russia would certainly not be the country that would be the first to develop and deploy a space-related weapon system, as this would contradict its long-standing policy on the question of weaponization of space and the practice of following the United States in most technological developments. Besides, it is unlikely that without the United States committing itself to space weapons development Russia would be able to make a decision to initiate any substantial effort of its own.

Even if the United States decided to introduce weapons in space, Russia would be unlikely to follow. Its own experience with anti-satellite programs is rather discouraging – capabilities of the system were very limited and its use would have virtually no impact on the ability of the United States to operate its space-based systems. Now that the U.S. capabilities in space increased, a system of the kind that the Soviet Union had in the 1970s would be even less useful. Among other factors that would certainly make development of space-related weapon systems less likely are the very high cost of systems like that and the lack of proper organizational structure that would be able to support development project in this area.

It would be more likely for Russia to turn to a policy of “asymmetric response”, planning for measures that would counter the systems developed by the United States should they present a threat to Russia’s space assets. This policy would be relatively easy to implement, for, as we already noted, the extent to which Russia relies on its space systems does not make its armed forces overly susceptible to an attack on space assets.

As we can see, Russia does not have many options when it comes to development of its own weapon systems in space or to its reaction to development of this kind of capability in other countries, namely the United States. However, this does not mean that there will be no reaction from Russia should the United States decide to go ahead with weaponization of space. As it was the case with the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the reaction might not be very visible, but strong nonetheless. For example, Russia has used the abrogation of the ABM Treaty as an excuse to extend service life of its multiple-warhead ballistic missiles and taking other measures that did not help make nuclear arsenals safer or more secure.

Eventually, it is measures like these that is the most significant and the most dangerous contribution to the cost of new military developments, whether it is missile defense or space-based weapons. The fact that they are not immediately apparent does not mean that they do not exist or that they should not be taken into account. Benefits of introducing weapons into space are highly questionable – there are very few, if any, cases that could possibly justify development of space-based weapon capability. If these benefits are weighed against the costs, the case for weaponization of space would be virtually indefensible.