It is not entirely unexpected that missile defense became a stumbling block at the U.S.-Russian new START negotiations. Russia, of course, wanted to somehow limit U.S. missile defense program from the very beginning, even though it agreed that the treaty will deal only with strategic offensive weapons at first - the April 1st, 2009 joint statement that stated the negotiations is quite clear about that:
The subject of the new agreement will be the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms
It is not uncommon for Russia, though, to strike an agreement and then come back and ask for more - there were a few attempts to insert missile defense into the discussion since then (e.g. here, here). The U.S. decision not to deploy a radar and interceptors in Czech Republic and Poland helped to calm the waters a bit and for some time it looked like that the momentum generated by that decision would help carry the negotiations through.
Well, it didn't quite work that way. It probably couldn't have anyway, especially if the United States hoped that cancelling the third site would solve all the problems. It was, of course, the issue Russia complained about the most, but these complains had nothing to do with the specific configuration of the missile defense system. In fact, I wrote at the time that
any changes of the system configuration that would try to address Russia’s concern in a narrowly defined technical way – e.g. changes in the deployment area or a move toward mobile or ship-based interceptors – are unlikely to change Russia’s position on missile defense in a substantial way.
Unfortunately, this is more or less what happened - after a period of relative calm opposition to U.S. missile defense is back. This time it appears to be focused on the plans to deploy elements of missile defense in Romania, but I would argue that the specifics are again immaterial. As far as I can tell, what happened was that Russia found out that it again has no leverage over missile defense decisions - not even a sort-of-legitimate reason to complain about deployment in Poland and Czech Republic. This situation proved a fertile ground for a new mistrust and for all kind of statements about hidden U.S. motives. (We should also keep in mind that no one in Moscow ruined their career by insisting that the U.S. missile defense is directed against Russia.)
I have been long arguing that the only way to solve the missile defense debacle is to give Russia some stake in the process, probably by engaging it in a discussion of ballistic missile threats and possible responses and moving toward cooperation. In theory, the U.S. administration seems to understand it - it found the right words for the joint summit statement back in July 2009 and was generally supportive of the idea of cooperation. But something didn't work in practice, so we are where we are today.
I am still a bit puzzled why settling on the final treaty language is taking that long. As far as I can tell, missile defense is the only really difficult issue and a solution has been already found - Russia will make a unilateral statement stating that it would reserve a right to withdraw from the treaty if deployment of U.S. missile defense jeopardized its supreme national interests. The United States is expected to issue a counterstatement, saying that such a strong reaction would be unwarranted. Something like this was done at the time the START treaty was signed. Admittedly, the situation then was a bit different - there was the ABM Treaty to refer to. This time the reference to the link between offense and defense is supposed to be included in the treaty, which could potentially make the unilateral statement quite a bit stronger. (This already made some U.S. senators nervous about letting Russia to make any statements - Kingston Reif has a good summary of the controversy.) So, I guess it might be difficult to come up with precise language. But it should not be taking months.
The most frustrating part of this controversy is that it is about nothing - missile defense will never be able to counter any kind of missile threat, let alone give Russia any reason to worry about "strategic balance" or things like that. What we see is that missile defense proved again that it is good at poisoning everything.
On March 4, 2010 at 7:50 MSK (04:50 UTC), the K-114 Tula submarine of the Project 667BDRM class conducted a successful launch of the Sineva version of the R-29RM missile. The submarine was deployed in the Barents Sea. According to the Roscosmos report, "all tasks of the launch have been completed".
There was no mention of the target area in the report. Missiles from the Barents Sea are normally launched toward the Kura test site on the Kamchatka Peninsula. However, the last time an R-29RM Sineva missile was launched from the Tula submarine, in October 2008, it was flown along an extended trajectory to a range of more than 11,000 km.
UPDATE 03/04/10: The Northern Fleet press service reports that "the warhead of the missile reached the designated area" at the Kura test site.
UPDATE 03/06/10: The Makeyev Design Bureau report lists time of the launch as 07:40 MSK. It also reports that the missile was tested as part of a series that confirms quality of serially-produced missiles ("контрольно-серийные испытания").
On March 1, 2010 (21:19 UTC, 2 March 2010 00:19 MSK) the Space Forces conducted a successful launch of a Proton-M launcher from the Baykonur launch site. The launch took place from the launch pad No. 24 of the launch complex No. 81. The launcher, equipped with a DM booster stage, successfully delivered into orbit three new Glonass-M satellites.
The satellites were deployed in the third orbital plane of the Glonass constellation. They received designations Cosmos-2459, Cosmos-2460, and Cosmos-2461. NORAD catalog numbers and international designations of the satellites are 36400/2010-007A, 34601/2010-007B, and 34602/2010-007C. The spacecraft joined the Glonass constellation that at that time consisted of 20 satellites, of which 18 are operational (one satellite has been withdrawn from the constellation around the time of the launch).
This launch was originally scheduled for 2009, but was postponed. In 2010 the Space Forces and Roskosmos plan to bring the number of Glonass satellites to 27 (of which 24 should be operational).
According to a report that quotes a Rocket Forces representative, deployment of the second Topol-M regiment at Teykovo was completed in 2009 after all, bringing the number of deployed Topol-M missiles to 18. This was planned for some time (there was an announcement in April 2009 and then in September 2009), but there was no report of the actual deployment in December 2009.
Since the deployment appears to have been completed in 2009, the Rocket Forces plan to deploy two Topol-M regiments by the end of 2010 - one mobile in Teykovo and one silo-based in Tatishchevo - would bring the number of mobile missiles to 27 and silo-based - to 60. This would add 19 or 20 missiles to the force - a fairly ambitious plan given that the rate of deployment so far has been on the level of 6-7 missiles a year. At the same time, 14 new Topol-M missiles were deployed in 2009, so 20 is not out of question.
The last three Topol missiles in Teykovo were apparently withdrawn from service.
BY PAVEL PODVIG | 25 FEBRUARY 2010
Since the United States and Russia might soon sign a new treaty that limits their strategic nuclear weapons, it's natural to wonder about Washington and Moscow's tactical nuclear weapons, which the treaty won't cover. The hope is that the momentum for a nuclear-weapon-free world, the renewed U.S.-Russian negotiations, and the ongoing review of the U.S. nuclear posture and NATO strategic concept will help make progress on reducing nonstrategic nuclear arsenals--an issue that has been largely neglected for more than a decade.
A primary reason for this neglect is the charged political atmosphere that accompanies any discussion of tactical nuclear weapons. For Washington's part, tactical nuclear weapons always have been an instrument of assuring its European and Asian allies of its commitment to protect them against aggression. Moscow, on the other hand, claims that its tactical weapons compensate for the relative decline of its conventional forces. So while both sides have been quietly reducing their tactical forces--according to the Bulletin's Nuclear Notebook, during the last decade Russia reduced the number of its nonstrategic warheads by about one-half and the United States by more than two-thirds--neither side has been willing to engage in formal talks about these reductions.
However, change is in the air. While the presence of U.S. nonstrategic weapons in Europe (based in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey specifically) has always had nongovernmental critics, now some of these individual governments are raising questions as well. Germany was the first to break ranks; its officials began speaking favorably about the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe several years ago. And last November, Berlin officially committed itself to the removal of U.S. weapons from German territory. Similarly, in early February, the Polish and Swedish foreign ministersurged both the United States and Russia to reduce the number of tactical weapons in Europe. Most recently, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norwayannounced that they will demand that the United States remove the weapons from Europe.
Nonetheless, there are still influential players who want the weapons to remain in Europe. Their key argument is that if the U.S. nuclear weapons are removed, NATO members would no longer trust Washington's commitment to protecting Europe. Such a move, the argument goes, will lead to all kinds of negative consequences--from triggering "a corrosive internal debate" within NATO to Turkey deciding to pursue its own nuclear weapon capability.
These arguments usually are taken quite seriously. But in the end, NATO should admit that if its members cannot trust each other unless they are held together by a nuclear booby trap, the alliance has significant problems. Some of these problems are already beginning to surface. For instance, the internal debate about the strength of Washington's commitment to NATO members has been underway for some time, and it's as "corrosive" as predicted. What isn't clear is why anyone should be scared of it; NATO is supposed to be the type of alliance that welcomes debate, not shies away from it.
Any conversation about nuclear weapons in Europe cannot avoid mention of the Russian nuclear arsenal. The United States is believed to have about 200 nuclear bombs deployed in Europe, a fraction of the 500 total tactical weapons in its active arsenal. Conversely, Russia is estimated to have about 2,000 active tactical nuclear warheads, most of which are probably in the European portion of the country. Moscow has taken the position that any dialogue about these weapons should begin only after every U.S. nuclear weapon resides within its borders and its borders only, putting the onus on Washington and NATO. But if the United States actually removes its weapons from Europe, would Russia be ready to respond constructively?
Certainly a reduction in the number of Russian tactical weapons is in order. Yet more than likely, Moscow would argue that the disparity in tactical weapons between it and Washington is there to compensate for the weakness of its conventional forces, spurring all kinds of issues related to NATO expansion and the often rocky Russia-NATO relationship. Even those who want the U.S. weapons removed from Europe usually assume that reductions in the Russian tactical nuclear force will depend on solving "the conventional military imbalances" between Moscow and NATO. Thus, finding an arrangement that takes into account the capabilities of conventional forces, tactical nuclear weapons, and their strategic counterparts will be nearly impossible. To complicate matters further, Russia might want to add missile defense to the equation. Given the complexity of the task, some might decide that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons should be left alone.
I believe, however, that the task of dealing with tactical nuclear weapons would be much easier if we take them for what they are--weapons with no military value whatsoever--instead of trying to balance them with everything else. There is more agreement on this issue than you might think. If there is any consensus in NATO's "corrosive internal debate," it's that the U.S. weapons in Europe are irrelevant militarily. As for Russia, despite its rhetoric, inertia left over from the Cold War seems to be the reason for the current composition of its tactical nuclear forces. (How else can one explain the more than 600 warheads allocated to the country's air defense?) Moscow already has consolidated its weapons at centralized storage facilities, so they aren't normally deployed with the units that are supposed to operate them. In an important development, the new Russian military doctrine doesn't include any specific mission for its tactical nuclear weapons. Of course, nobody in Russia is ready to get rid of them just yet, but it does indicate that the Russians realize that the utility of these weapons is highly questionable, even if they aren't ready to publicly admit it.
One possible first step would be for Moscow and Washington to withdraw their tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, moving them to centralized storage facilities deep inside their national territories. (Two former German security officials made a similar proposal in early February.) Once such an agreement was reached, other aspects of the deal could be discussed. For instance, Russia and the United States (or maybe NATO) could agree on verification measures that would certify that no weapons have been left behind and implement measures that would make the withdrawal irreversible. Eventually, they would have to make a commitment to eliminating these weapons altogether, but securing them at storage facilities would be a reasonable first step. As for transparency, while ideally Washington and Moscow would declare their holdings, this isn't an absolutely necessary element of the arrangement--at least not at the first stage, when it's more important to make sure that tactical nuclear weapons are safely and securely isolated.
Such an agreement won't be easy. But if the European NATO members are persistent in their calls for withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe and the Obama administration holds strong against criticism from defense hawks, then it just might come together.
On February 5, 2010 President of Russia formally approved the new military doctrine, whose text is now available, and a document called "Basic principles of state's policy in the area of nuclear deterrence through 2020", which appears to be classified.
Nikolay Sokov, who has been following the Russian doctrinal debate closely, has a detailed analysis. The key point, however, is that despite the earlier signs that the doctrine would expand the use of nuclear weapons and even allow for preventive and preemptive strikes, the final document is quite reasonable. As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, the key statement of the new doctrine is that
Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against her and (or) her allies, and in a case of an aggression against her with conventional weapons that would put in danger the very existence of the state.
This is, actually, not bad, since the scope of the use of nuclear weapons is quite limited. For example, a limited conventional aggression against Russia would not trigger a nuclear response. Neither would a "regime change" in an allied country, as long as it doesn't cross the nuclear threshold.
Of course, it is a declaratory policy and one can argue that things may change in a heat of a crisis. This is true, but the doctrine sets a baseline, which says that Russia is quite restrained in setting goals for its nuclear forces.
On January 28, 2010 Space Forces successfully launched a Proton-M rocket from the launch pad No. 24 of the launch complex No. 81 of the Baykonur launch site. The launch took place at 03:18 MSK (00:18 UTC). The rocket and the Briz-M upper stage successfully delivered the satellite to a geosynchronous orbit. The Space Forces announced that this is a new type of satellite, which would allow expanding the capability of the military communication network.
The satellite was given an international designation 2010-002A and the NORAD number 36358. It is a communication relay satellite of the Raduga-1M class (these satellites also sometimes known as Globus). The first satellite of this type, Raduga 1M-1 (32373), was launched in December 2007. It is now deployed at 70E degrees. The Space Forces also operate at older Raduga-1 satellites, two of which appear to be operational today - Raduga 1-7 (32373, 85E) and Raduga 1-8 (34264, 12E, moved from 17E after 22 January 2010).
On January 22, 2009, the Zvezdochka shipyard formally handed over the K-18 Karelia submarine to the Northern Fleet. The Project 667BDRM/Dleta IV class submarine had been in overhaul since August 2004. It is now equipped with Sineva modification of the R-29RM missile.
It was reported earlier that Karelia conducted 38 patrols and traveled 140 thousand miles during its 15 years in service so far. This time the number of patrols is reported as 12 "combat services" and 26 "combat duty patrols". It's not quite clear what's the difference between these. The submarine also took part in 14 missile launch exercises.
It looks like the deployment of RS-24 is delayed for more than a month or two. The Vedomosti newspaper quotes a source in the Ministry of Defense as saying that the deployment will begin in 2011, after one or two additional flight tests. The source also said that the missile will carry three warheads, which apparently confirms my old estimate - MIRVed Topol-M could carry three warheads with yield of about 400 kt each.
The next flight test of the Bulava missile will not take place until summer of 2010, according to the Russian media, who quote a source in the Russian Navy. The plan is to conduct two more tests of the missile from its current test bed, Dmitry Donskoy submarine, and then, if these tests are successful, test the missile from the Yuri Dolgorukiy submarine some time in the fall.
This decision, as well as the decision to postpone the construction of the fourth submarine of the Project 955 class, are a natural reaction to the latest failure of the missile test program. Even in the best circumstances, the lead submarine of the Project 955 class - Yuri Dolgorukiy - will not be able to begin service until some time in 2011. And that's the optimistic scenario. (It may be worth remembering that in 2005 the Navy expected to have two submarines equipped with Bulava missiles in 2006.) And the chances that Sevmash will actually start construction of the fourth Project 955 hull now seem fairly dim.
UPDATE 01/12/10: Vedomosti quotes a source close to the investigation of the last failure as saying that the cause of the failure was a malfunction of the "trust control mechanism of the third-stage motor". The motor is Elements of the third stage motor are produced by the NPO Iskra in Perm.
UPDATE 01/12/10: According to other reports, there might be more than two test launches from Dmitri Donskoy in 2010.
The book
